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Evidence in prior research suggests that firms that manipulate earnings and/or analyst 
earnings expectations are likely to report earnings that precisely meet or narrowly beat 
analyst earnings forecasts, resulting in a zero or small positive earnings surprise. 
Investors, therefore, are likely to be more skeptical of a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise in their attempt to identify possible manipulators on the earnings 
announcement date. I test the hypothesis by comparing the earnings response 
coefficients (ERCs) across ranges of earnings surprises. I find that the ERC is lower 
for zero and small positive earnings surprises than the ERCs for earnings surprises in 
adjacent ranges. The result is consistent with investors seeing a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise in and of itself as an indication that manipulation has occurred. By 
comparing the relation between analyst revisions of next-quarter earnings and the 
current-quarter earnings surprise across ranges of earnings surprises, I also find 
evidence that analysts regard zero or small positive earnings surprises as the results of 
manipulations, and respond negatively to such earnings surprises. 
 I further examine abnormal stock returns in a post-earnings announcement period 
in which full balance sheet data are released. Negative CARs are associated with zero 
and small positive earnings surprises, suggesting that while investors are skeptical of 
a zero or small positive earnings surprise on the earnings announcement date, they 
underestimate the probability that such an earnings surprise is achieved via earnings 
management on that day and/or the extent to which earnings management contributes 
to such earnings surprises.   
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CHAPTER 1   
 INTRODUCTION  
 
The accounting literature documents significant discontinuities around zero in the 
distributions of forecast errors (Degeorge et al. 1999, Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003, 
Burgstahler and Eames 2006,). The findings are generally referred to as a “number 
game” played by managers and analysts. That is, managers manipulate earnings 
upward or guide forecasts downward so as to meet or beat analyst forecasts with the 
intention to reap the financial and capital market benefits associated with meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts (Matsunaga and Park 2001, Bartov et al. 2002). Investors, 
however, are not entirely silent on the “number game”. Bartov et al. (2002) and Lopez 
and Rees (2002) show that reduced capital market premium is associated with 
suspected cases of meeting analyst forecasts through earnings management. Both 
Bartov et al (2002) and Lopez and Rees (2002) rely upon discretionary accruals 
estimated from Jones-type models. However, it is still not clear how investors respond 
to the “number game” at the time of earnings announcement when balance sheet 
information is not yet available to investors to evaluate possible earnings management. 
How do investors identify cases of earnings management at the time of earnings 
announcement? Do investors learn from academic research and industry press on the 
“number game” played by mangers and analysts?  This study attempts to shed light on 
these research questions by examining investor response to the discontinuity around 
zero in the forecast-error distribution around earnings announcement date.  
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It is costly for firms to manipulate earnings or analyst earnings expectations 
(Degeorge et al. 1999). Thus, firms would not find it to their advantage to manipulate 
earnings and/or expectations to the extent that reported earnings beat analyst 
expectations by a large margin. It benefits them more to manipulate earnings and/or 
expectations just enough to allow reported earnings to precisely meet or narrowly beat 
analyst earnings forecasts, resulting in zero or small positive earnings surprises. This 
argument is supported by the empirical evidence in Degeorge et al. (1999) and 
Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003), which shows abnormally high concentrations of 
observations just above analyst earnings expectations and abnormally low 
concentrations just below them. 
This study examines how investors respond to zero and small positive earnings 
surprises. I first investigate the possibility that investors rely on “a zero or small 
positive earnings surprise” as a simple yet effective clue to identify possible 
manipulators on the earnings announcement date. Investors may rationally regard 
firms reporting zero or small positive earning surprises as possible manipulators and 
respond unfavorably. I test this hypothesis by comparing investor response to zero and 
small positive earnings surprises relative to earnings surprises in adjacent ranges. 
Investor response to earnings surprises in each range is measured by the coefficient in 
the regression relating abnormal stock returns to the earnings surprise, or the earnings 
response coefficient (ERC). If investors associate a zero or small positive earnings 
surprise with manipulation, the ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises 
should be lower than the ERCs for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges. This is 
because zero and small positive earnings surprises that are the result of earnings 
management are less indicative of the firm’s profitability and likely to be followed by 
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lower future cash flow, and consequently are likely to be associated with a weaker 
investor response and a lower ERC. Zero and small positive earnings surprises that 
are the result of analyst expectations management have lower surprise content, and 
therefore are likely to be associated with a lower ERC as well.  
I conduct the analysis based on data of firm-quarters in 1992-2004. To investigate 
the temporal change in investor response, I also examine the 1992-1997 and 1998-
2004 periods separately. Tests using the full sample show that ERC is an inverted U 
shaped function of the earnings surprise, with extreme earnings surprises associated 
with smaller ERCs than moderate earnings surprises. The result is consistent with 
prior studies suggesting that abnormal stock returns are an S-shaped function of the 
earnings surprise (see Freeman and Tse 1992; Kinney et al. 2002). More importantly, 
zero and small positive earnings surprises are associated with a significantly lower 
ERC than are earnings surprises in adjacent ranges. This is consistent with the notion 
that investors are more skeptical of zero or small positive earnings surprises and 
impose a penalty on firms reporting such earnings surprises. Interestingly, this result 
holds only for firm-quarters in 1998-2004, but not those in 1992-1997, a pattern 
which suggests that investor skepticism toward a zero or small positive earnings 
surprise is a fairly recent phenomenon, probably instigated by public figures 
denouncing firms managing earnings and/or analyst expectations (e.g., Arthur Levitt’s 
1998 famous speech) and frequent press reports as well as academic research on the 
prevalence of this practice in late 1990s. I also explore the time-series trend of the 
ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises. I document that the yearly ERC 
for zero and small positive earnings surprises is decreasing over the entire sample 
period, and is significantly related to the ratio of small misses over meets and small 
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beats which captures management’s propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts.1 This 
result provides strong support for the connection between the lower ERC for zero and 
small earnings surprise and management’s tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts.  
In addition, I rule out the possibility that the results are not explained by investor 
skepticism towards a zero or small positive earnings surprise, but rather by my failure 
to control for firm attributes that also affect the ERC. Prior research (e.g., Bartov et al. 
2002) shows that the ERC is affected by the sign of estimated discretionary accruals 
and the change in analyst earnings forecasts over time. Controlling for these variables 
in my test does not change the results.2  This suggests that investors see a zero or 
small positive earnings surprise as a red flag in and of itself. In other words, the fact 
that the firm reports a zero or small positive earnings surprise has incremental 
information content about whether manipulation has occurred over and above other 
signs of manipulation.  
Also, I examine analyst revisions of the earnings forecasts for the next quarter 
after the announcement of the current quarter’s earnings. I observe a positive relation 
between analyst revisions of earnings forecasts for the next quarter and the earnings 
surprise of the current quarter for all firm-quarters except those with a zero or small 
positive earnings surprise. The result suggests that analysts also see a zero or small 
positive earnings surprise as a red flag for manipulations and respond unfavorably to 
such earnings surprises. 
 I further examine abnormal stock returns of firms reporting a zero or small 
positive earnings surprise in a post-earnings-announcement period during which 
                                                        
1
 The lower the ratio, the more likely managers are engaged in manipulations to avoid reporting negative earnings 
surprises. 
2
 I obtain this result, although, as I explain in the text, the test results are biased against finding a lower ERC for 
zero and small positive earnings surprises than ERCs for earnings surprises in other ranges.  
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balance sheet data are released. I find that zero and small positive earnings surprises 
are associated with negative returns in the post-earnings-announcement period, 
indicating that investors further penalize firms reporting a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise when balance sheet data enable them to tell with greater certainty 
whether these firms indeed have managed earnings and the extent of earnings 
management. I interpret the result as suggesting that while investors see a zero or 
small positive earnings surprise as a red flag on the earnings announcement date, they 
underestimate the probability that such an earnings surprise is achieved via earnings 
management on that day and/or the extent to which earnings management contributes 
to such earnings surprises.   
This study makes a contribution to the literature by shedding new light on how 
investors and analysts identify manipulators of earnings and analyst expectations. 
Prior research (Bartov et al. 2002; Defond and Park 2001) suggests that investors and 
analysts do so based on “hard evidence” that manipulation has occurred, i.e., positive 
estimates of abnormal working capital or discretionary accruals, or a downward 
analyst forecast trajectory. I show evidence that investors and analysts also associate 
certain firms with manipulation even in the absence of hard evidence. A mere 
closeness of the reported earnings to the earnings benchmark is sufficient to trigger 
suspicions and negative reactions from investors and analysts. This study thus 
advances our understanding of how the game described by Degeorge et al. (1999) 
between firms on one side and analysts and investors on the other is played. 
This study also provides first evidence that great publicity of firms manipulating 
earnings and/or analyst expectations has increased investor awareness and intensified 
their efforts to identify the wrong-doers. While evidence suggests many firms meet or 
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beat earnings benchmarks through illegitimate means starting from early 1990s 
(Brown 2001, Matsumoto 2002), it appears that investors had not started to penalize 
firms with a zero or small positive earnings surprise until late 1990s, i.e., after being 
exposed to frequent news reports on improper accounting practices and public 
denunciations of such practices by regulators and public figures.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews prior related 
studies, which lead to the hypotheses proposed in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 outlines the 
test methodology and describes the sample collection process, followed by Chapter 5 
which presents and discusses the main results. Chapter 6 then investigates investor 
response to zero and small positive earnings surprises after earnings announcement 
date. Chapter 7 presents the concluding remarks. 





Prior studies provide earnings management evidence based on accruals or 
discretionary accruals (e.g., Healy 1985, Jones 1991, Dechow et al. 1995), and real 
activities (e.g., Baber et al. 1999, Dechow and Sloan 1991, Bushee 1998). Another 
popular approach relies exclusively on the distribution of reported earnings. Hayn 
(1995) is the first to document the abnormally higher concentrations of cases just 
above zero earnings, and the abnormally lower concentrations of cases just below 
zero earnings. She interprets the finding as evidence consistent with managers 
manipulating earnings to surpass the “red line”. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) also 
find similar discontinuities around zeros in the distributions of annual earnings levels 
and annual earnings changes. The authors show that about 9%-12% of firms with pre-
managed earnings below earnings of previous year manage the numbers to report an 
earnings increase, and that about 30%- 44% of firms with pre-managed earnings 
below zero manage earnings to report a positive number. Degeorge et al. (1999) find 
discontinuities around zero EPS, zero change in EPS, and zero analyst forecast errors, 
suggesting that managers tend to manage earnings to exceed the three thresholds. 
Moreover, the authors find that managers set priority of meeting one threshold over 
meeting another. Managers first seek to meet zero earnings, and then earnings of the 
prior corresponding period, and lastly analyst earnings forecasts. In other words, 
avoiding losses and earnings decreases seems to be the most important goal that 
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managers seek to achieve in their sample period. Consistent with the findings in 
Degeorge et al. (1999), Brown and Caylor (2005) find the same managerial threshold 
hierarchy in the years from 1985 to 1995. However, they find a shift in the managerial 
threshold hierarchy after 1995. Analyst forecasts have become the most important 
threshold that managers seek to meet since 1996. They argue that the shift in the 
managerial threshold hierarchy is caused by the shift in the valuation consequences of 
meeting different thresholds. In recent years, the market rewards firms more for 
avoiding negative quarterly earnings surprises than for avoiding losses and earnings 
decreases. Managers thus took the cue from capital markets and re-order the quarterly 
earnings thresholds. Evidence of increasing managers’ tendency to meet or beat 
analyst earnings expectations is also provided in Brown (2001), Bartov et al. (2002), 
Lopez and Rees (2002), and Matsumoto (2002), all of which show that the percentage 
of positive earnings surprises has been increasing in recent years. 
The discontinuities in the distributions provide evidence consistent with earnings 
management, but do not reveal how the earnings are managed. To provide direct 
evidence of earnings management, researchers investigate how managers reach the 
earnings targets.  Several studies provide evidence of earnings management to meet 
analyst forecasts based on discretionary accruals estimated from Jones type models. 
Burgstahler and Eames (2006) show that firm-years with zero forecast errors exhibit 
more positive discretionary accruals than firm-years in the adjacent categories. Payne 
and Robb (2000) show that firms tend to report positive discretionary accruals when 
firms’ pre-managed earnings (earnings before discretionary accruals) are below 
analyst consensus forecasts. Matsumoto (2002) shows that positive discretionary 
accruals are associated with a higher probability of meeting or beating analyst 
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forecasts, consistent with managers manipulating accruals to avoid negative earnings 
surprises. Moreover, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2003) find that the higher frequency of 
small positive forecast errors relative to small negative forecast errors (the middle 
asymmetry) disappears after reported earnings component of the earnings surprise is 
stripped of discretionary accruals. More recently, Ayers et al. (2006) find a stronger 
positive association between discretionary accruals and beating analyst forecasts than 
other pseudo unexpected earnings targets (other points except zero in the analyst 
forecast error distribution), providing strong support for earnings management to meet 
or beat analyst earnings forecasts.3  
Many other studies provide earnings management evidence without relying upon 
discretionary accruals estimated from Jones type models.4  For example, Barton and 
Simko (2002) find that firms with less earnings management constrains are more 
likely to meet or beat analyst forecasts. The constrains are measured as net operating 
assets over total sales to reflect the extent of previous earnings management, since the 
balance sheet accounts accumulate all the prior effects of earnings management. 
Dhaliwal et al. (2003) present evidence that firms manage income tax expense to meet 
analyst forecasts. The authors show that firms decrease their annual effective tax rate 
from the third quarter to the fourth quarter as earnings (before tax expense 
management) fall short of the consensus forecast. Moehrle (2002) finds that managers 
are more likely to reverse restructuring charges when pre-reversal earnings fall below 
                                                        
3
 However, Ayers et al. (2006) do not find stronger positive association between discretionary accruals and beating 
zero earnings or previous period’s earnings than other pseudo earnings targets. Similarly, Dechow et al. (2003) do 
no find accrual based earnings management evidence around zero earnings. 
4
 Many other papers present evidence of earnings management to meet or beat zero earnings and previous period’s 
earnings. Phillips et al. (2003) show that the increase in deferred tax expense increases the probability of managing 
earnings to avoid reporting an earnings decline and earnings loss, after controlling for abnormal accruals. Beaver et 
al. (2003) show that property-casualty insurers with small positive earnings understate loss reserves relative to 
insurers with small negative earnings. Beatty et al. (2002) provide earnings management evidence in the banking 
industry.  
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analyst forecasts or below zero earnings. Managers may also manipulate real activities 
to meet earnings thresholds in addition to managing accruals, as argued by 
Roychowdhury (2005). These real activities include price discounts to temporarily 
boost sales, overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of 
discretionary expenditures. 5  She produces evidence consistent with her argument. 
Zang (2005) find that there is a substitution effect between the accrual management 
and real activity management and that managers employ these strategies sequentially: 
managers select real earnings manipulation before resorting to accrual manipulation. 
Bartov and Cohen (2007) show a decline in the use of expectations management and 
accrual management, and no change in real earnings management in the Post-SOX 
Period relative to the preceding seven-year period.  
 In addition to manipulating accruals and real activities, managers can also 
manipulate core earnings by shifting the classification of items in the income 
statements. McVay (2006) provides evidence that managers shifting between core 
earnings and special items in order to meet analyst forecasts, as special items are 
usually excluded from analyst earnings definition. The evidence is stronger for growth 
firms, which have stronger incentive to meet analyst forecasts than value firms 
(Skinner and Sloan 2002). 
While majority of evidence is consistent with earnings management explanation, 
some other studies offer alternative explanations for the discontinuities in the 
distributions Dechow et al. (2003) propose several non-earnings-management 
explanations, including (a) exchange listing requirements having a selection bias 
towards profitable firms, (b) investors applying different valuation methods to profit 
                                                        
5
 Other papers present earnings management to meet or beat the other two thresholds through manipulating cash 
flow (Burgstahler and Dichev  1997; Bushee 1998). 
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versus loss firms and thus scaling earnings by market value accentuates (c) accounting 
rules and conservatism precluding the recording of small losses and encouraging the 
recording of small profits, and (d) the market-wide use of financial assets with return 
distributions truncated at zero inducing a greater proportion of small profit firms. 
Beaver et al. (2003) show that the asymmetric treatment of income taxes and special 
items for profit and loss firms explains the discontinuity in the distribution of earnings 
levels and earnings changes. Durschi and Easton (2005) find that market prices of 
profit firms differ markedly from those of loss firms, which place one-cent per share 
losses in earnings/price interval further from zero than one-cent per share profit. They 
also show that the discontinuity in the frequency distribution of I/B/E/S/ annual actual 
EPS and change in EPS is due to the fact that the proportion of firms with small losses 
that are followed by I/B/E/S/ is much smaller than the proportion of firms with small 
profits that are followed by I/B/E/S. The authors further show that forecast errors tend 
to be much greater when analysts are optimistic than when they are pessimistic, 
leading to discontinuity at zero in the forecast error distribution. The authors therefore 
caution against using discontinuities in the distributions as ipso facto evidence of 
earnings management.  
While researchers have divergent opinions regarding to how to interpret the 
discontinuity in the distributions, the question of how investors perceive the 
discontinuity is relatively less explored in the literature. Xue (2004) examines the 
market reactions to firms’ beating or missing zero earnings and previous period’s 
earnings. She finds that after controlling for earnings levels and earnings surprises, the 
abnormal returns around the earnings announcement dates of firms reporting small 
profit or earnings increases are significantly higher than returns of firms just missing 
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the two thresholds. Her findings are consistent with managers manipulate earnings 
around thresholds to signal future performance. However, Xue (2004) does not 
investigate how investors respond to meeting or narrowly beating analyst forecast.  As 
analyst forecasts have become the most important earnings targets managers are 
intended to meet (Brown and Caylor 2005), how investors respond to manipulations 
to meet or beat analyst forecasts deserve some attention. Bartov et al. (2002) show 
that possible earnings management (to meet analyst forecast) cases are associated 
with statistically significantly but economically insignificantly lower premium. The 
possible earnings management cases are defined as firms-quarters that report earnings 
meeting or beating analyst forecasts (referred as MBE) but fail to maintain MBE 
designation after adjusting for discretionary accruals. The two discretionary accruals 
measures the authors use are abnormal accruals estimated from Jones model and 
abnormal portion of the non-operating accruals (accruals other than working capital 
accruals, depreciations and amortization). Bartov et al. (2002) also find that the 
capital market premium is reduced but still present for cases consistent with analyst 
expectations management. The expectations-management cases are defined as firm-
quarters with negative forecasts errors (actual minus individual analyst forecast issued 
at the beginning of the quarter) and zero or positive surprises (actual minus individual 
forecast nearest to the earnings announcement date). Bartov et al. (2002) use 
cumulative stock returns over a quarter from the day when the first analyst forecast is 
issued after the earnings announcement of the previous quarter to the day after 
earnings announcement. The return window extends to 50 days after earnings 
announcement of the current quarter in the tests concerning discretionary accruals, to 
allow enough time for investors to fully digest the accrual information. However, the 
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research question on how investors react to suspect cases at the time of earnings 
announcement and how the reaction changes over time still remain unanswered. This 
study attempts to fill this gap in the literature. 
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CHAPTER 3  
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
Earnings management is a dynamic game, in which managers can manipulate 
earnings over multiple periods. In a simplified 2-period scenario in which managers 
maximize their own benefits and outsiders reward managers based on whether they 
meet or beat thresholds, Degeorge et al. (1999) predict that managers will borrow 
future earnings and pump up earnings in the current period to surpass the threshold in 
order to reap the benefits, if true earnings are just below the threshold. In the next 
quarter, earnings may again fall short of market expectations and managers may face 
the same incentive to borrow future earnings. However, it is not possible for managers 
to consistently manipulate earnings upward without market finding out such 
manipulations. Investors anticipate firms engaged in earnings management to 
experience a significant price drop due to earnings management being found or 
earnings growth created by manipulation not being sustained.  
Managers can also manipulate earnings through many venues. Prior research 
shows managers may manipulate earnings through accrual management (Matsumoto 
2002), real economic activities (Roychowdhury 2005), or deliberate misclassification 
of items within income statement (McVay 2006). Earnings management through 
accrual manipulation may not have a real impact on firm operation but generally 
requires changes in assumptions subject to auditor’s approval, particularly when 
managers’ incentives to manipulate earnings are strong if true earnings are just below 
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the threshold. Real activity manipulations may be less subject to the auditor’s scrutiny 
but are costly as they affect the firm operations. For example, cutting R&D may 
severely affect the firm’s long term competitive edge. Thus, earnings management 
comes with a cost. Moreover, earnings created through manipulation are less 
sustainable and mask the true performance of the firm. For example, underestimating 
bad debt allowance increases earnings in the current period, but may decrease 
earnings of future periods when bad debt allowance restores to its normal balance. 
Earnings created through cash flow management is also less sustainable: cutting 
prices to boost sales in the current period dampens the demand for the next period and 
leads customers to expect a similar price-cutting, resulting in lower future cash 
inflows (Roychowdhury 2005); over-production of the current period reduces the cost 
of goods sold in the current period but increases the cost of goods sold for the future 
periods, which in turn, reduces future earnings (Thomas and Zhang 2002). So long as 
investors believe earnings management occurs and such earnings management has 
negative impact on the long-term firm performance, investors will discount the values 
of the firms that have engaged in earnings management. Thus, positive earnings 
surprises created by manipulating earnings are less predictive of future cash flow and 
therefore should be associated with lower Earnings Response Coefficient (ERC), as 
ERC is positively related to the persistency of future cash flow (Easton and Zmjewski 
1989) under the condition that investors are able to identify manipulators. 
However, it is difficult to identify firms that manipulate earnings and/or analyst 
expectations even for academic researchers, and probably more so for investors. 
Academic researchers often use discretionary accruals models to identify firms that 
manage earnings (e.g., Healy 1985, Matsumoto 2002, Ashbaugh et al. 2003). These 
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models can be unreliable, as Dechow et al. (1995) and Kothari et al. (2005) show, and 
may cause misidentifications in many cases. These models, moreover, require balance 
sheet data, which in most cases are released weeks or even months after the earnings 
announcement date. Balsam et al. (2002) show that only 7.3% of firms issue detailed 
press release along with quarterly earnings, and only 2.8% of firms disclose balance 
sheet information. Besides, as stated earlier, firms do not just manipulate accruals to 
meet analyst earnings expectations; they also change real economic activities (e.g., 
R&D) in many cases (see Bushee 1998 and Cheng 2004). It is even more difficult, if 
possible, to detect firms that alter real economic activities to meet earnings 
expectations.  
Academic researchers also have trouble identifying manipulators of analyst 
expectations. Some studies identify expectations manipulators as firms for whom 
analysts lower earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement date (e.g., Bartov 
et al. 2002). But analysts may lower earnings expectations for various reasons, not 
necessarily as a result of firms’ attempt to manipulate their expectations. Using this 
approach to identify firms that manipulate earnings expectations may also lead to 
misidentifications. 
Therefore at the time of earnings announcement, it is an asymmetric information 
situation in which managers are informed of how meeting or beatings are achieved 
while investors are kept uninformed. Under the assumption that investors are able to 
fully discount biased reports of managers, the theoretical paper by Milgrom and 
Robert (1986) predicts a “skepticism equilibrium” in which the informed party 
(managers) announces the most favorable report consistent with the true state, and the 
uninformed party (investors) assumes the worst. Under the assumption that investors 
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are uncertain about the quality of managers’ report, Shin’s (1994) theoretical model 
predicts that the value of firms is a function of investor skepticism towards the 
disclosures of managers. One implication of Shin’s (1994) model is that other things 
being equal, firms that investors have higher skepticism towards will have a lower 
price/earnings ratio. Investors are likely to be more skeptical of cases where reported 
earnings precisely meet or narrowly beat analyst forecasts.  These cases are likely to 
arouse suspicions because manipulations of earnings or analyst earnings expectations 
could entail substantial costs to the firm. As upward earnings management involves 
shifting accruals to the current period from future periods, it reduces earnings in the 
future, making it more difficult for the firm to meet future earnings expectations. Also, 
upward earnings management is likely to raise earnings expectations in the future, 
further reducing the odds of meeting earnings expectations in the future. Managers 
therefore will not find it advantageous to manipulate earnings to the extent that 
reported earnings beat analyst expectations by a large margin. Nor will managers find 
it advantageous to manipulate analyst expectations to the extent that they are 
exceeded by reported earnings by a large margin, because doing so will gratuitously 
increase stock price volatility as well as reduce the credibility of managers with 
analysts. Empirical results in Degeorge et al. (1999) and Abarbanell and Lehavy 
(2003) are consistent with the theory, showing more (fewer) firms than expected 
meeting or narrowly beating (narrowly missing) earnings expectations. Researchers 
therefore regard a zero or small positive earnings surprise as more likely a result of 
earnings management. Balsam et al. (2002) use “zero and small positive surprises” as 
one of their criteria in identifying possible cases of earnings management.  Market 
participants are also fully aware of the “number game”. For example, analysts 
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acknowledge that “there may be some added degree of pressure to do that (manage 
earnings), given the market environment and how badly stocks are punished for 
missing estimates."6   Regulators, moreover, see a zero or small positive earnings 
surprise as a red flag: “a pattern of narrowly meeting or exceeding analysts’ estimates 
is among the characteristics that the Securities and Exchange Commission uses in 
identifying possible accounting irregularities” (Bryan-Low 2002). Learning from the 
above sources, investors are likewise more skeptical of a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise than larger earnings surprises. In other words, the fact that a firm 
reports a zero or small positive earnings surprise has incremental information content 
about whether manipulation has occurred over and above other signs of manipulation 
such as positive estimated discretionary accruals. I therefore predict: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Investors perceive a zero or small positive earnings surprise to be more 
likely the result of earnings and/or analyst expectations management on the earnings 
announcement date. Thus, stock price reactions to such earnings surprises during the 
earnings announcement window are likely to be weaker than expected.  
 
To the best of my knowledge, the hypothesis has never been tested in prior studies, 
either directly or indirectly. Bartov et al. (2002) show the price reactions are affected 
by the sign of estimated discretionary accruals and the trajectory of analyst earnings 
forecasts over time. They do not investigate whether investors rely on a simple clue – 
a zero or small positive earnings surprise – to identify possible manipulators. Their 
tests, moreover, are based on abnormal returns accumulated over a period starting 
from the announcement of the previous quarter’s earnings. In their tests on whether 
                                                        
6
 See “a penny shaved is a penny earned” Business Week (August 6th, 2001). 
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investors penalize firms that manage earnings, furthermore, the abnormal returns 
accumulation period ends 50 days after the close of the current quarter.7 Their results, 
therefore, shed no light on the question of whether investors attempt to identify 
possible manipulators of earnings and/or analyst expectations on the earnings 
announcement date and how they do so. 
                                                        
7
 The CAR accumulation period for tests in Bartov et al. (2002) on whether investors penalize firms that 
manipulate earnings ends 50 days after the end of the quarter because, as stated earlier, balance sheet data which 
are needed to estimate discretionary accruals are unavailable in most cases until weeks or even months after the 
earnings announcement date. 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND SAMPLE  
 
 
4.1 Research Design 
To test Hypotheses 1, this study compares investor response to earnings surprises in 
various ranges. I measure investor response to earnings surprises in each range by the 
coefficient in the regression relating cumulative abnormal stock returns over a 3-day 
period centered on the day of earnings announcement to the earnings surprise (scaled 
by the share price). The coefficient is known in the literature as the earnings response 
coefficient or the ERC. The short period over which I accumulate abnormal returns 
allows us to examine whether investors attempt to identify firms that manage earnings 
and/or analyst expectations on the earnings announcement date and how they do so. If 
investors believe that zero and small positive earnings surprises are more likely to be 
the results of earnings management than earnings surprises in other ranges, they 
would judge such earnings surprises as less indicative of the firm’s future profitability 
and more likely to be followed by lower earnings in the future. If investors also judge 
zero and small positive earnings surprises as more likely to be the result of analyst 
expectations management than earnings surprises in other ranges, such earnings 
surprises are likely to be proportionally less “surprising” and make less impact on 
investors’ views of the companies than earnings surprises in other ranges. Each unit of 
earnings surprise therefore is likely to elicit a smaller response from investors for 
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earnings surprises in the “zero and small positive” range than for earnings surprises in 
other ranges, resulting in a lower ERC for earnings surprise in the former range. For 
example, if investors believe that firms guide analyst forecast to be 20 cents per share, 
investors’ earnings expectation may actually be 21 cents per shares. Therefore, 
investors will be negatively surprised if actual earnings are 20 cents per share (zero 
earnings surprises as measured by actual earnings minus analyst forecasts), or not be 
surprised if actual earnings are 21 cents per share. 
Prior studies (e.g., Easton and Zmijewski 1989, Defond and Park 2001, Bartov et 
al. 2002) estimate the ERC by regressing abnormal returns on the earnings surprise 
scaled by stock price: 
                         CAR = α + β(ES/P) + ּּּּּ + ε  
where CAR is cumulative abnormal returns during the earnings announcement period, 
ES is the earnings surprise, calculated as actual earnings per share minus the 
consensus analyst forecast, and P is the price per share. The coefficient β in the 
regression model is the earnings response coefficient (ERC).  
In this study, I also estimate the ERC by regressing abnormal stock returns on the 
earnings surprises scaled by share price. What is unique about my regression model is 
that it allows for the possibility that abnormal stock returns during the earnings 
announcement period depend not only on the scaled earnings surprise (ES/P), but also 
on the characteristics of the unscaled earnings surprise (ES) itself. If investors are 
skeptical of zero or small positive earnings surprise, abnormal stock returns associated 
with any given value of ES/P should be lower if the ES is zero or slightly above zero. 
To illustrate, assume there are two firms, A and B. ES is 1¢ for firm A and 3¢ for firm 
B. P is $10 for firm A and $30 for firm B. While the two firms have the same ES/P, 
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the 1¢ earnings surprise reported by firm A may be seen by investors as a red flag for 
manipulations. In that case, abnormal stock returns during the earnings announcement 
period are likely to be lower for firm A than for firm B.  
 If abnormal stock returns associated with any given value of ES/P are lower if the 
ES is zero or slightly above zero, the relation of CAR with ES/P is weakened for firms 
with zero or small positive earnings surprises, resulting in a smaller ERC. To 
investigate whether that is the case, I partition unscaled earnings surprises (ES’s) for 
all firm-quarters in my sample into 14 classes/ranges based on proximity to zero, and 
estimate the relation of CAR with ES/P separately for ES’s in each class/range. In 
other words, I estimate a separate ERC for each unscaled earnings surprise class/range. 
Earnings surprises less than -8¢ per share are included in Class R
-7 . Class R-6 
comprises ES’s in the [-8¢,-6¢) range (greater or equal to -8 cents and less than -6 
cents); Class R
-5 comprises ES’s in [-6¢, -4¢); Class R-4 comprises ES’s in [ -4¢,-3¢); 
Class R
-3 comprises ES’s in [-3¢ ,-2¢); Class R-2 comprises ES’s in [-2¢ , -1¢); Class R-
1 comprises ES’s in [-1¢,0); Class R0 comprises ES’s in [0, 1¢]; Class R1 comprises 
ES’s in (1¢,2¢]; Class R2 comprises ES’s in (2¢,3¢]; Class R3 comprises ES’s in 
(3¢,4¢]; Class R4 comprises ES’s in (4¢,6¢]; Class R5 comprises ES’s in (6¢,8¢]; and 
Class R6 comprises ES’s greater than 8¢. Note that Class R0 and possibly Class R1 
comprise earnings surprises that investors are most likely to be suspicious about. ES is 
calculated as the follow: 
forecastactual EPSEPSES −=  
where ForeccastEPS  is the mean consensus analysts’ forecasts of earnings per share from 
I/B/E/S unadjusted summary tape.8  
                                                        
8
 Using median consensus analyst forecasts does not change my results. Payne and Thomas’s (2002) suggest 
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actualEPS  is actual EPS reported by I/B/E/S. Both ForeccastEPS  and actualEPS  from 
I/B/E/S unadjusted summary file are unadjusted for stock splits, so ES is the actual 
earnings surprise at the time of earnings announcement. 
4.1.1 Primary Test Model 
To estimate and compare ERCs across earnings surprise classes/ranges, I develop a 










kka PESDCARCAR εββα ;   ------------ (1) 
where: 
CAR[-1,1]: cumulative abnormal returns from 1 day before the earnings 
announcement date to 1 day after; 
CAR[-20,-2]: cumulative abnormal returns from 20 days before the earnings 
announcement date to 2 days before; 
Dk: earnings surprise dummy, equal one if the raw earnings surprise falls in Class Rk 
and zero otherwise; 
ES/P: earnings surprise (ES) scaled by the share price one day before I/B/E/S latest 
consensus calculation date. 9 
The dummy variables D’s allow a separate ERC to be estimated for each of the 14 
earnings surprise classes/ranges. I predict that ERCs for zero and small positive 
earnings surprises are likely to be smaller than ERCs for earnings surprises in 
adjacent ranges. I do not compare the ERC for zero earnings surprises with the ERCs 
                                                                                                                                                               
calculating consensus analyst forecast from I/B/E/S detailed file, rather than using summary consensus from 
I/B/E/S summary tape, to avoid rounding error problem. Recently, I/B/E/S provides unadjusted file for the purpose 
of avoiding rounding error problem. In the robustness check section, I show that my main result holds using the 
most recent single analyst forecast as an alternative measure of analyst earnings expectations. 
9
 I estimate the regression with data pooled across all firm-quarters in my sample. The subscripts for firm and 
quarter are suppressed for simplicity. 
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for large earnings surprises, because prior studies show that large earnings surprises 
are associated with lower ERCs since large earnings surprises are less persistent. A 
number of prior studies examine the relation of stock returns with scaled earnings or 
the scaled earnings surprise separately for various partitions of the sample (e.g., Hayn 
1995; Freeman and Tse 1992; Das and Lev 1994; Lipe et al. 1998).10 These studies 
partition the sample based on scaled earnings or the scaled earnings surprise. This 
study differs from theirs in that the partition of the sample is based on un-scaled 
earnings surprises.  
My return window starts cumulating from day -1, but the I/B/E/S consensus 
analyst forecasts used as a proxy for market expectations are issued on average 20 
days before the earnings announcement date. Therefore, the earnings surprises are 
measured with errors. Following Easton and Zmijewski (1989), I include cumulative 
abnormal returns after I/B/E/S calculation date till 2 days before the earnings 
announcement CAR[-20,-2] in the regression to mitigate the measurement errors in 
the earnings surprises.11 The coefficient on CAR[-20,-2] is expected to be negative. 
To measure abnormal stock returns around earnings announcements, I need to 
control for stock returns covariation as a source of risk. I estimate the following 
market model over the 255-day period ending 41 days before the earnings 
announcement:  
jtmtjjt RR εβα ++= ; 
where jtR  is the return for the firm j on day t; mtR  is the equally weighted market 
return on day t. Estimates of the coefficients of the market model are used to estimate 
                                                        
10
 Freeman and Tse (1992), Das and Lev (1994), and Lipe et al. (1998) test the nonlinearity of the relationship of 
abnormal stock returns with the scaled earnings surprise or scaled earnings. The procedure is equivalent to testing 
whether the returns-earnings relation varies across sample partitions.  
11
 My results showed in Chapter 5 are not changed if I drop CAR[-20,-2] from the regression.  
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daily abnormal returns using the equation: 
);( mtjjjtjt RRAR
∧∧
+−= βα  
Cumulative abnormal returns from the day before the earnings announcement date 








jtj ARCAR ; 
Cumulative abnormal returns from 20 day before the earnings announcement date 









jtj ARCAR  
4.1.2 Nonlinear Model 
Essentially, I am examining whether the ERC for zero and small positive earnings 
surprises is smaller than predicted from non-linear surprise-return relation. Thus, I 
adopt the non-linear models used in Lipe et al. (1998) to control for non-linearity in 
surprise-return relations, and at the same time allow ERC for zero and small positive 
earnings surprises to be different from as predicted by the non-linear model. 12 
Specifically, I estimate the following model: 
PESPESPESCARCAR /|/|/ 21)2,20(10)1,1( ××+×++= −−− ββββ   
      + εβ +×× PESMNB /3      ------------- (2) 
The model includes both ES/P and |ES/P| ×ES/P terms to address the nonlinearity. 
The coefficient on the  term |ES/P| ×ES/P is expected to be negative. MNB equals 1 if  
0=<ES =< 1¢, and zero otherwise. The coefficient 3β  captures investor response to 
                                                        
12
 I also try the arctangent nonlinear model used by Freeman and Tse  (1992). The results are similar to 
those using Lipe et al. (1998) nonlinear model.  
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zero and small positive surprises after controlling for s-shape surprises return relation. 
I expect 3β  to be negative.  
 
4.2 Data and Sample 
4.2.1 Sample Selection 
The preliminary sample consists of firm-quarters in 1992-2004 in the intersection of 
I/B/E/S, CRSP and Compustat. The sample period starts from 1992 because prior 
studies suggest that management’s tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts in 
evident in the years after 1992 (Brown 2001, Bartov et al. 2002, Matsumoto 2002, 
Lopez and Rees 2002).13  Analyst earnings expectations, actual earnings per share and 
the number of analysts following each firm are from I/B/E/S unadjusted summary 
tape. Stock returns, market returns and share prices used to scale earnings surprises 
are obtained from CRSP. Control variables like market value, market to book ratios as 
well as variables needed to estimate discretionary accruals from the modified Jones 
model are obtained from Compustat. Table 4.1 shows sample sizes for each step of the 
sample selection procedure. 
<------ Insert Table 4.1 here-----> 
Following prior studies (Burgastahler and Dichev 1997; Brown and Caylor 2005), 
I delete firms with SIC codes 4400-5500 (regulated industries) and 6000-6500 
(financial institutions). I also delete firm-quarters with cumulative abnormal returns 
around the earnings announcements, and/or earnings surprises in the top or bottom 1 
                                                        
13
 Matsumoto (2002) show that the percentage of meeting analyst forecast is consistently above 50% 
after year 1992. Bartov et al. (2002) show that the proportion of non-negative earnings surprises 
increased from about 50% in the years 1983–1993 to almost 70% in the more recent period of 1994–
1997. 
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percent from the sample to mitigate the effect of potential outliers.14 These deletions 
leave 118,136 firm-quarters in the sample for the primary test. The sample size is 
further reduced for tests involving control variables, which are obtained from 
Compustat. For these tests, I delete those with missing data for the control variables. 
The sample for tests involving control variables includes 86,651 firm-quarters. 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 shows the means of variables of interest in various earnings surprise 
classes. Since earnings and analyst expectations management was more severe in 
more recent years, I split the sample into two subsamples, one for firm-quarters in 
1992-1997 and the other for firm-quarters in 1998-2004, and report the means of the 
variables for each sub-sample. The variation of CAR[-1,1] across the earnings 
surprise classes is of interest as it shows the relation of average abnormal returns with 
the magnitude of raw earnings surprise. As showed in Table 4.2, mean CAR[-1,1] is 
monotonically increasing across the earnings surprise classes in the full sample and in 
the two sample subperiods. 
<---- Insert Table 4.2 here---> 
 I separate zero earnings surprises from the rest in the [0, 1¢] range to gain a better 
insight into investors’ attitudes toward earnings that precisely meet analyst 
expectations. CAR[-1,1] is negative for zero earnings surprises for the full sample and 
for both the 1992-1997 and 1998-2004 subsamples. It seems investors look 
unfavorably at firms that precisely meet analyst earnings expectations. This result is 
consistent with Baber and Kang (2002) which show that 3-day returns for “on-target 
                                                        
14
 Following prior literature (e.g. Bartov et al. 2002;  Lopez and Rees 2002), I truncate top and bottom 1 percent of 
extreme values either earnings surprises or 3-day CAR distributions. My results are unchanged if I truncate top and 
bottom 0.5% of extreme values. 
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earnings” are negative. Moreover, mean CAR[-1,1] for zero earnings surprises for the 
1998-2004 subsample is -0.8%, much larger than that for the 1992-1997 subsample (-
0.08%), suggesting increasing unfavorable investor response toward reported earnings 
that precisely meet expectations in recent years. The unfavorable response seems to 
extend to earnings surprises in the (0, 1¢] range as well. While it is 0.64% for the 
1992-1997 sample period, mean CAR[-1,1] for earnings surprises in this range is only 
0.24% for the 1998-2004 subsample.  
Table 4.2 also shows mean prices and the number of observations across various 
earnings surprise ranges. Prices seem to increase monotonically from negative 
earnings surprises classes to positive surprises classes. There are no significant 
differences in price between the two subsamples, particularly in zero ES range and ES 
(0,1¢] range. Consistent with the literature, there is more clustering of observations in 
zero ES class and ES(0,1¢] class. 
 
4.3 Preliminary Evidence 
To further explore the temporal change in investor response to zero and small positive 
earnings surprises, I examine mean CAR[-1,1] for zero ES and ES (0,1¢] across the 
years over the sample period.  Panel A  of Table 4.3 shows that mean CAR[-1,1] for 
zero earnings surprises declines steadily over the 1992-2004 period, suggesting a 
rising investors’ unfavorable response towards zero earnings surprises. In fact, 
investor response to zero earnings surprises is consistently and significantly negative 
after year 1998. For example, mean CAR[-1,1] for earnings meeting consensus 
analyst forecasts exactly in the year 2004 is -0.8%, with t-value of -4.99. This result 
suggests that on average firms exactly meeting analyst forecasts are punished. It is 
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interesting that investors’ negative attitude toward zero earnings surprises appears to 
be related to the incidence of firms managing earnings and/or expectations to avoid 
negative earnings surprises over the years. Figure 4.1 plots the mean and median 
CAR[-1,1] for zero ES and the ratio of the number of earnings surprises in the [-1¢, 0) 
range to the number in the [0, 1¢] range. Consistent with prior literature, the ratio 
declined steadily over the same period, suggesting a rising incidence of management 
intervention to avoid negative earnings surprises. Note that the ratio steadily 
decreased from about 40% in the year 1992 to about 22% in the year 2004. I run 
simple regression of the mean CAR[-1,1] on the ratio. The up-right corner of Figure 
4.1 shows the regression results. T-statistics from the regression is 4.25, and adjusted-
R2 from the regression is 0.59, suggesting that a large proportion of the variation of 
investors’ average response to a zero earnings surprise can be explained by the ratio 
capturing management’s tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts. This result shows 
a significant link between negative investor response to firms exactly meeting analyst 
forecasts and management’s propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts, and provides 
strong support for the argument that the negative 3-day CAR for zero earnings 
surprises are due to investors’ seeing a zero earnings surprises as an indicator of 
management intervention in the earnings reporting process. 
<---- Insert Table 4.3 here---> 
<---- Insert Figure 4.1 here---> 
I also examine mean CAR[-1,1] for small positive earnings surprises, ES (0,1¢]. 
My hypotheses predict that abnormal stock returns associated with any given value of 
ES/P should be lower if the ES slightly above zero: investors respond less favorably 
to a 1¢ surprise for a firm with a price of $10 than a 3¢ surprises for a firm with a 
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price of $30, even though both cases give the same price scaled earnings surprises 
(ES/P). I test this prediction by matching each of cases in ES(0,1¢] class, with cases 
that have similar ES/P but with unscaled earnings surprises greater than 1 cent. I 
achieve this by ranking all positive earnings surprises into 200 portfolios according to 
ES/P each year.15  The matched portfolio for a small beat contains all non-small-beat 
cases with same ES/P ranking as the small beat. The adjusted CAR[-1,1] for the small 
beat is simply the difference between CAR[-1,1] for each of small beats and mean 
CAR[-1,1] of the matched portfolio (excluding small beats) to which the small beat 
belongs.16  The adjusted CAR[-1,1] for small beats thus captures investor response to 
“small positive earnings surprises” heuristic, after controlling for investor response to 
ES/P.17  The matching method also has the advantage of not assuming any specific 
form of surprise-return relations. 
<---- Insert Figure 4.2 here---> 
Table 4.3, Panel B shows that mean CAR[-1,1] for small positive earnings 
surprises, mean CAR[-1,1] for the matched portfolio, and the difference between the 
two (the adjusted mean CAR[-1,1]). The adjusted mean CAR[-1,1] for small positive 
earnings surprises declined steadily over the 1992-2004 period. Investor response to 
small positive earnings surprises is consistently and significantly negative in recent 
years except for year 2000, suggesting an increasingly unfavorable response towards 
small positive earnings surprises. Figure 4.2 visualizes the decreasing trend. Again, I 
run simple regression of the mean adjusted CAR[-1,1] on the ratio. The up-right 
corner of Figure 4.2 shows the regression results. T-statistics from the regression is 
                                                        
15
 Ranking observations into 100 portfolios does not change my results. 
16
 In case a small beat does not have a match, the nearest non-small beat portfolio is used. 
17
 I test whether the result still hold if ranking observations into 200 portfolios according to the earnings surprises 
scaled by absolute value of actual earnings per share. The results are similar to those using price scaled earnings 
surprises: the adjusted CAR[-1,1] are consistently negative in latter years of the sample periods, and the regression 
of the mean adjusted CAR[-1,1] on the ratio shows significant results. 
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4.64, and adjusted-R2 from the regression is 0.63, suggesting that a large proportion of 
the variation of investors’ overall response to small positive earnings surprises can be 
explained by the ratio capturing management’s tendency to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts. This result indicates that investors increasingly regard a small positive 
surprise as an indicator of management intervention, and respond less favorably to 
small positive earnings surprises. 
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No. of firms 
 
 










Deleting observations from regulated firms (SIC 4400-5000) and 
financial institutions (SIC 6000-6500) 125,606 7,629 
 
Primary sample after deleting outliers 
 
118,136 7,394 
Firm-quarters with available control variable data               
 
86,651 4,834 
   
Firm-quarters year (for primary sample)  
1992 6,336 2,262 
1993 6,952 2,523 
1994 8,619 2,996 
1995 8,193 3,092 
1996 10,170 3,593 
1997 11,910 3,942 
1998 11,677 3,987 
1999 10,658 3,745 
2000 7,926 3,300 
2001 7,928 2,949 
2002 8,417 2,823 
2003 8,489 2,697 
2004 10,861 2,810 
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TABLE 4.2 


























              
CAR[-1,1] Full 0.20* -2.20* -1.84* -1.65* -1.37* -1.03* -0.51* 0.40 1.43* 1.72* 2.17* 2.75* 
 Sub1 0.27* -1.93* -1.42* -1.18* -1.17* -0.70* -0.08 0.64* 1.52* 1.88* 2.09* 2.76* 
 Sub2 0.15* -2.50* -2.29* -2.16* -1.58* -1.35* -0.80* 0.24 1.37* 1.62* 2.23* 2.74* 
              
ES/P Full -0.18 -2.05 -0.46 -0.36 -0.23 -0.10 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.76 
 Sub1 -0.23 -1.88 -0.40 -0.31 -0.20 -0.09 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.31 0.72 
 Sub2 -0.13 -2.23 -0.53 -0.40 -0.25 -0.12 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.35 0.79 
              
P Full 21.57 17.22 17.37 17.37 17.84 18.97 20.97 22.46 23.38 23.92 24.09 26.40 
 Sub1 21.53 18.03 18.38 17.84 18.31 19.62 20.86 22.40 23.37 23.64 23.68 26.72 
 Sub2 21.60 16.33 16.29 16.87 17.33 18.34 21.05 22.51 23.38 24.11 24.36 26.17 
              
EPS_actual Full 0.22 -0.01 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.40 
 Sub1 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.44 
 Sub2 0.20 -0.05 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.37 
              
N Full 118,136 18,476 3,053 3,794 5,458 8,484 18,401 16,337 11,501 7,538 5,254 19,840 
 Sub1 52,180 9,706 1,576 1,959 2,796 4,186 7,378 6,611 4,589 2,964 2,071 8,344 
 Sub2 65,956 8,770 1,477 1,835 2,662 4,298 11,023 9,726 6,912 4,574 3,183 11,496 
 
Note:  
Full:  period from 1992-2004  Sub1: period from 1992-1997  Sub2:  period from 1998-2004 
CAR[-1,1]:  cumulative abnormal returns from one day before the earnings announcement date to one day after, in percentage terms.  
 *: significantly different from zero at 5% level or above. 
ES/P:  earnings surprise defined as actual earnings per share reported by I/B/E/S minus mean analysts’ consensus forecast as reported in the unadjusted 
I/B/ES summary tape scaled by price, in percentage terms 
P:     share price one day before the date earnings consensus are estimated by I/B/E/S. 
N:   number of observations 
ES [a, b):  earnings surprises greater or equal to a and smaller than b.  
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TABLE 4.3 
Mean CAR[-1,1] for Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises across Years 
 
Panel  A:  Zero ES 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
              
Mean CAR[-1,1] 0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.008 -0.006 -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.008 
              
T-statistics 0.51 -0.34 0.41 -2.39 0.06 0.88 -2.38 -4.33 -2.54 -3.22 -5.88 -6.87 -4.99 
              
No.  of Obs. 714 895 1,187 1,131 1,587 1,864 2,093 1,779 1,209 1,356 1,551 1,435 1,600 
              
Panel B: ES(0,1¢] 
 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
              
Mean CAR[-1,1] 0.009 0.003 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.003 0.001 
              
Matched Mean CAR[-1,1] 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.013 0.014 0.014 0.011 0.004 0.014 0.013 0.013 
              
Adjusted Mean CAR[-1,1] 0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.012 -0.010 -0.012 
              
T-statistics 1.53 -0.27 -1.12 -3.46 -2.62 -3.93 -5.41 -3.92 -2.83 -0.86 -5.29 -4.23 -6.27 
              
No.  of Obs. 611 667 972 951 1,216 1,642 1,567 1,428 1,004 1,121 1,306 1,252 1,437 
              
 
Note:  Panel A reports mean CAR[-1.1] for zero earnings surprises across years. T-statistics are from testing whether mean CAR[-1,1] is different from zero. Panel B 
reports mean CAR[-1,1] for small positive earnings surprises, and mean CAR [-1,1] for match cases, which are cases that have the same scaled earning surprises as 
each case in ES (0,1¢] range, but do not fall in ES (0,1¢] range. To achieve the matched cases, all positive earnings surprises are ranked into 200 portfolios each year. 
For each of the cases in ES (0,1¢]range (small beats), the matched cases are all the non-small-beat cases that have the same scaled earnings surprises ranking as the 
small beat. Adjusted Mean CAR[-1,1] is simply mean CAR[-1,1] minus the matched mean CAR[-1,1]. T-statistics are from testing whether adjusted mean CAR[-1,1] 
is different from zero. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
Mean and Median CAR[-1,1] for Zero Earnings Surprises and the Ratio of Number of Earnings Surprises in the [-1¢, 0) Range to 































a Left scale for CAR[-1,1] for zero earnings surprises  
b Right scale for the ratio of the number of earnings surprises in the [-1¢, 0) range to the number of earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range.  











t-value:4.25; adj-R2: 0.59 
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FIGURE 4.2 
Mean and Median Adjusted CAR[-1,1] for Small Positive Earnings Surprises and the Ratio of Number of Earnings Surprises in 






























a Left scale for adjusted CAR[-1,1] for earnings surprises in the (0,1¢] range. 
b Right scale for the ratio of the number of earnings surprises in the [-1¢, 0) range to the number of earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range.  
The up-right corner reports the estimates of simple regression of yearly adjusted mean CAR[-1,1] on the yearly ratio. 
Each year, All positive earnings surprises are ranked into 200 portfolios. Adjusted CAR[-1,1] is calculated as CAR[-1,1] for the small beat minus the 










Mean adjusted CAR[-1,1]=-0.02+0.05ratio 
t-value:4.64; adj-R2: 0.63 
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CHAPTER 5   
MAIN RESULTS 
 
5.1 Skepticism towards a Zero or Small Positive Earnings Surprise 
5.1.1 Lower ERC for Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises 
I estimate the primary regression, Regression (1), with data pooled across all firm-
quarters. The results for the full sample and for the 1992-1997 and 1998-2004 
subsamples are reported in Table 5.1. The result for the full sample shows that the 
ERC is smaller for extreme earnings surprises than for moderate earnings surprises. 
The ERC for earnings surprises lower than minus eight cents is 0.39, much lower than 
ERCs for earnings surprises in other ranges. Similarly, the ERC for earnings surprises 
exceeding eight cents is 1.27, also much lower than ERCs for earnings surprises in 
adjacent ranges. As shown in Figure 5.1 (top panel), the ERC rises across the ranges 
of negative earnings surprises, peaking at earnings surprises in the [-1¢,0) range, and 
then declines across the ranges of positive earnings surprises. The variation of the 
ERC across the various earnings surprise ranges therefore has the shape of an inverted 
U. Freemen and Tse (1992) and Kinney et al. (2002) document an S-shaped relation 
between abnormal stock returns and the earnings surprise scaled by stock price, 
suggesting the ERC is lower for larger scaled earnings surprises (in absolute value). 
They attribute the result to the large transient components in earnings associated with 
extreme scaled earnings surprises and high analyst forecast dispersion for firms with 
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extreme scaled earnings surprises. While differences in test design do not allow a 
direct comparison of my results with theirs, the factors they cite for their results may 
also explain why the distribution of ERC across unscaled earnings surprise ranges has 
the shape of an inverted U. 
The ERC for earnings surprises in the [-1¢, 0) range is 5.39 the highest of all. The 
high ERC for earnings surprises in this range which represents narrow misses, is 
consistent with anecdotal evidence that firms incur significant loss if they fail to meet 
analyst forecasts even by a small margin, i.e., investors severely punish firms that 
report small misses.18 
<------ Insert Table 5.1 here -----> 
       <----- Insert Figure 5.1 here -----> 
The primary question I investigate in this study is whether investors react 
unfavorably to zero or small positive earnings surprises. Figure 5.1 shows a 
discontinuity in the inverted-U shaped relation between ERC and earnings surprise. 
There is an obvious “hole” which is associated with earnings surprises in the [0, 1¢] 
range. As the result for the full sample in Table 5.1 shows, the ERC for earnings 
surprises in the [0,1¢] range is 1.02, lower than the ERC for earnings surprises in the 
(1¢,2¢] range (2.69). An F-test shows that the difference is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The ERC for earnings surprises in the [0, 1¢] range is also significantly 
lower than that for earnings surprises in the [-1¢,0) range, as well as the average of the 
ERC for earnings surprises in the (1¢,2¢] and that for earnings surprises in the [-1¢,0) 
range (both p-values lower than 1%). The result is supportive of Hypothesis 1 which 
predicts that investors regard a zero or small positive earnings surprise as an indicator 
                                                        
18
 In his famous 1998 speech at NYU, Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt argues that firms are under increasing 
pressure to “make your numbers.” He states “I recently read of one major U.S. company that failed to meet its so-
called “numbers” by one penny, and lost more than six percent of its stock values in one day.” 
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of manipulations and respond unfavorably to firms reporting these earnings surprises. 
Table 5.1 also presents the regression results for 1992-1997 and 1998-2004 
subsamples.19 I plot the variation of the ERC across ranges of earnings surprises for 
the two subsamples in Figure 5.1 (Panel B). The results for the two sample periods are 
significantly different. On average, ERCs for positive earnings surprises are higher 
than those for negative earnings surprises in the 1992-1997 period. This result is 
consistent with Lopez and Rees (2002), whose sample period covers 1984-1998. 
However, contrary to the findings in Lopez and Rees (2002), ERCs for positive 
earnings surprises appear lower on average than ERCs for negative earnings surprises 
in the period 1998-2004. Investors seem to shift from rewarding positive earnings 
surprises more to punishing negative earnings surprises more in more recent years.20 
The result is consistent with recent anecdotal evidence that investors punish negative 
earnings surprises severely.  
My focus is on the zero and small positive earnings surprises. The ERC for 
earnings surprises in the [0, 1¢] range is lower that the ERCs for earnings surprises in 
the adjacent ranges for 1998-2004 subsample, but not for the 1992-1997 subsample. 
In subsample 1998-2004, the ERC for earnings surprises in [0,1¢] is not significantly 
different from zero, and is lower than the ERC for earnings surprises in (1¢,2¢] (1.91), 
the ERC for earnings surprises in [-1¢,0) (5.78), and the average of the these two 
ERCs. The difference in each case is statistically significant at 1% level. For the 1992-
1997 subsample, however, the ERC for earnings surprises in [0,1¢] is 5.67, not 
statistically different from the ERC for earnings surprises in (1¢,2¢] (5.71) and the 
                                                        
19
 The cut off year of 1998 is chosen because it gives two subsamples with about the same number of observations. 
Moreover, it is expected greater market awareness of managers’ meeting and beating strategy. My result is not 
altered if using 1997 or 1999 as cut off point. 
20
 Note that higher ERC for negative earnings surprises suggests more unfavorable market response to negative 
earnings surprises. As a result, managers still have incentive to avoid reporting negative earnings surprises. 
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ERC for earnings surprises in [-1¢,0) (4.03). This result suggests that investors do not 
regard a zero or small positive earnings surprise as an indicator of manipulations in 
the 1992-1997 period.  
To further explore the time-series trend of investors’ unfavorable response towards 
zero and small positive earnings surprises, I repeat Regression (1) for each year from 
1992 to 2004. Table 5.2 reports the results of the yearly regressions. The last two 
columns of Table 5.2 compare the difference between the ERC for range [0, 1¢] and 
the ERCs for range [-1¢,0) and range (1¢,2¢]. The ERC for range [0, 1¢] is generally 
higher than that for the range [-1¢,0) from 1992 and 1998. However, the ERC for 
range [0, 1¢] is consistently lower than the ERCs for adjacent ranges after year 1999. 
Alternatively, I add a time trend in the regression to capture the time series change in 
market response to zero and small positive earnings surprises. In particular, the 








kka PESDCARCAR ββα  ES’[0,1¢]+ε -----------(3) 
Table 5.3 shows that the coefficient in the time trend t is -0.73 and statistically 
significant. This result provides strong support that investors increasingly regard a 
zero or small positive earnings surprise as a simple clue for earnings management.  
Figure 5.2 plots the ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises across 
years. It is observed that the ERC is declining significantly from 7.00 in the year 1992 
to a number insignificantly different from zero in the year 2004, suggesting rising 
investor negative response toward zero earnings surprises over the sample years. The 
decreasing trend of ERC for zero and small positive surprises coincides with the 
increasing managers’ tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts. Figure 5.2 shows that 
the ratio of the number of earnings surprises in the [-1¢, 0) range to the number in the 
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[0, 1¢] range is declining steadily over the same period, suggesting a rising incidence 
of management intervention to avoid negative earnings surprises. The ratio is lowest 
in the year 2002, suggesting the manipulation is most severe in this year. Interestingly, 
the market response to zero and small positive surprises is also the lowest. The ratio 
and the yearly ERC appear to have a certain degree of correlation. The regression of 
yearly ERC for zero and small positive surprises on the ratio shows a good fit with 
adjusted R2 of 34% (t-statistics: 2.70), suggesting that the ratio captures management 
tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts and can explain the variation of investor 
response towards zero and small positive earnings. 
These results seem to suggest investors are more skeptical of zero or small 
positive earnings surprises in late 1990s. Brown (2001), Matsumoto (2002), and 
Bartov et al. (2002) document an upward temporal trend in the proportion of reported 
earnings meeting or beating earnings expectations, with the proportion increasing 
substantially each year since early 1990s. Against this backdrop, greater investor 
skepticism and cautiousness towards earnings that meet or narrowly beat analyst 
expectations in the late 1990’s than in the early 1990’s, as my results suggest, would 
have been well justified. Moreover, the stronger unfavorable investor response to zero 
and small positive surprises coincides with the increased awareness of the “number 
game” the managers are playing. Recent articles in the academic and public press, and 
warnings by regulators, including Arthur Levitt’s famous speech at NYU in 1998, 
have raised investor awareness of management intervention to avoid negative 
earnings surprises. Greater investor awareness of the issue in recent years is likely to 
be a contributing factor to greater investor skepticism toward earnings that meet or 
narrowly beat earnings expectations in the later years in the sample period. 
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The coincidence between a lower ERC for zero and small positive surprises and 
management’s propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts strongly supports the 
argument that the lower ERC for zero and small positive surprises is due to investor 
skepticism towards these surprises. If the lower ERC for zero and small positive 
surprises is simply caused by measurement errors or misclassification of zero or small 
positive earnings surprises, there is no reason to expect the temporal trend of the 
lower ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises, and the coincidence 
between the lower ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises and 
management’s propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts.  
5.1.2 Non-linear Regression  
I examine whether investors respond unfavorably to zero and small positive surprises 
using the non-linear model developed by Lipe et al. (1998) to control surprise-return 
relation. Table 5.4 reports results of the estimation of the non-linear regression, 
Regression (3). For the full sample, the coefficient on MNB is -2.18 (t-statistics: -
6.20), suggesting that ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises is much 
lower than that predicted by s-shape return-surprise relation. Moreover, the MNB 
coefficient is significantly negative for the second period (-2.79, t-statistics: -6.63), 
but is positive for the first period (0.64, t-statistics: 0.90). The results are basically 
consistent with that provided in Table 5.1. However, cautions must be taken when 
interpreting the result of the non-linear regression. The non-linear model assumes 
symmetric market response to positive earnings surprises and negative earnings 
surprises, while results in Table 5.1 suggest that the market response is stronger for 
negative earnings surprises than for positive earnings surprises, particularly for small 
misses. By forcing symmetric market response to positive and negative earning 
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surprises, nonlinear models may exaggerate the negative market response to zero and 
small positive earnings surprises.  
<------ Insert Table 5.4 here -----> 
I also estimate non-linear regression each year from 1992-2004. The result (not 
tabulated) shows a similar downward trend of the coefficient of MNBx(ES/P). 
Moreover, the regression of yearly coefficients for MNBx(ES/P) on the ratio of 
narrow misses over meets or narrow beats shows a good fit with adjusted R2 of 28% 
(t-statistics: 2.36).  
5.1.3 Regression with Control Variables 
ERC is likely to be affected by certain firm-specific attributes (Easton and Zmijewski 
1989, Collins and Kothari 1989, Hayn 1995). Following Defond and Park (2001), I 
re-estimate the ERC for earnings surprises in each range while controlling for the 
number of analysts following the firm, firm size, market to book ratio, earnings 
volatility, growth in book value of equity, and earnings persistency. I also control for 
loss (negative EPS), as Hayn(1995) shows that ERC is depressed for firms reporting 
negative EPS. Specifically I estimate the following model:   









kka PESDCARCAR ββα + 8β (M/B dum.×ES/P 9β+ (Size dum.×ES/P) 
+ 10β (Earnings volatility dum.×ES/P)+ 11β  (Earnings persistency dum.×ES/P) 
+ 12β (Growth dum.×ES/P)  + 13β (No. of analyst dum.×ES/P) + 14β (Loss 
dum.×ES/P)+ε  -------------  (4) 
Where: 
Market to book dummy = 1 if market to book ratio is above the sample median and 0 
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otherwise. 
Size dummy=1 if market value of firm at the end of the quarter is above the sample 
median in a particular year and 0 otherwise. 
Earnings volatility dummy = 1 if variance of ROE over the past five years is above 
the ample median and 0 otherwise. 
Earnings persistency dummy = 1 if )1( θ−  is above the sample median and 0 
otherwise. θ is from the estimation of time series model 
11 −− ×−+= YYYY EPSEPS εθε
. EPS data from 1988 to 2004 are used to 
estimate the parameterθ . 
Growth dummy=1 if average growth rate in book value of equity over past three years 
is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. 
No. of analyst dummy= 1 if the number of analysts following the stock tracked by the 
I/B/E/S is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. 
Loss dummy=1 if EPS is negative and 0 otherwise. 
As the result in the full sample column in Table 5.5 shows, all the coefficients for 
the control variables have the same sign as predicted. The ERC is higher for growth 
firms, large firms, and firms with more persistent earnings, and is lower for firms with 
higher earnings volatility. The findings are consistent with theoretical predictions and 
prior studies (Easton and Zmijwski 1989, Collins and Kothari 1989, among others). 
The coefficient for Loss dummy is significantly negative, consistent with the 
prediction of Hayn (1995). 21  More importantly, in the full sample, the ERC for 
earnings surprise in the [0, 1¢] range remains lower than those for earnings surprises 
in the right and left adjacent ranges, and lower than the average of the two ERCs. The 
                                                        
21
  I also allow the coefficient on Loss dummy to vary across different earnings surprises ranges. Unreported 
results suggest that the coefficient on Loss is consistently negative across earnings surprises ranges. 
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difference in each case in significant at the 1% level. Again, the results for the two 
subsamples are similar to that reported in Table 5.1: the lower ERC for zero and small 
positive surprises is not found in the first sample period, but is highly significant in 
the second sample period. Therefore, my finding is robust after controlling for 
potentially omitted variables. 
<------ Insert Table 5.5 here -----> 
5.1.4 Additional Tests 
1) I use an alternative measure of analyst earnings expectations: the most recent single 
analyst forecasts. Although consensus analyst forecasts are what the companies are 
reportedly trying to beat, Brown (2001), Bartov et al. (2002), and Brown and Caylor 
(2005) use the most recent single analyst forecasts as analyst earnings expectations. I 
re-estimate the coefficients of Regression (1) using the new measure of analyst 
expectations to calculate earnings surprises. The results are reported in Table 5.6. 
Similar to the results reported in Table 5.1, the ERC is significantly lower for earnings 
surprises in the [0,1¢] range than ERCs for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges for 
the full sample. The ERC in ES[0,1¢] is 1.76, significantly lower than the ERCs in 
adjacent ranges (5.72 and 2.97 respectively). The results for the two subsamples are 
also similar to those in Table 5.1: the evidence of a lower ERC for zero and small 
positive earnings surprises is significant in the 1998-2004 subsample but not in the 
1992-1997 subsmaple. 
<------ Insert Table 5.6 here -----> 
2) The literature commonly normalizes surprises by deflator such as price. I test 
whether my results still hold when using alternative scale factor for earnings surprises. 
Specifically, I regress return on raw earnings surprises with the absolute value of 
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actual earnings reported by I/B/E/S as a scaling factor, i.e., scaled earnings surprises= 
(actuals-analyst forecasts)/|actuals|. Table 5.7 reports the results using this alternative 
scaling factor. In the full sample column, the “ERC” for zero and small positive 
surprises is 0.00, significantly lower than “ERCs” in adjacent ranges (0.03), consistent 
with the prediction of Hypothesis 1. Moreover, somewhat surprisingly, the coefficient 
for zero and small positive surprises is significantly lower than those in adjacent 
ranges in the first sample period. Although the alternative scaling factor affects my 
results to some extent, the coefficient for zero and small positive surprises in the 
second sample period is still lower than that in the first sample period. 
<------ Insert Table 5.7 here -----> 
3) I examine whether investors regard a zero or small positive earnings surprise as an 
indicator of manipulations in the sample period 1984-1991. 22   Brown (2001), 
Matsumoto (2002), Lopez and Rees (2002), and Bartov (2002) all document that the 
management tendency to meet or beat analyst forecasts starts from early 1990’s.23  
Thus I do not expect investors respond unfavorably to zero and small positive 
earnings surprises in this sample period. Based on 31,684 observations in the pre-
1992 sample period, the estimation of Regression (1) shows that the ERC for zero and 
small positive earnings surprises is not significantly lower than the ERCs for adjacent 
earnings surprise ranges.  
4) I investigate whether investors respond differently to habitual reporter versus 
occasional reporters of zero or small positive earnings surprises. It is possible that 
investors are particularly skeptical of zero and small positive earnings surprises 
                                                        
22
 I/B/E/S starts coverage of quarterly earnings analyst forecasts from the year 1983. Year 1983 has much less 
observations than the other years, and therefore is merged with year 1984. 
23
 For example Bartov et al. (2002) show that the proportion of favorable earnings surprises is about 50% in the 
period from 1983-1993. Similarly, Lopez and Rees (2001) show that the ratio of positive earnings surprises over 
negative earnings surprises is generally below 1 prior to year 1992. 
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reported by firms that repeatedly report zero or small positive earnings surprises. To 
test this conjecture, I further partition zero and small positive earnings surprises into 
two classes, according to the past frequency of reporting zero or small positive 
earnings surprises. The frequency is defined as the number of times that a firm reports 
zero or small positive earnings surprises divided by the total number of quarterly 
earnings announcements by the firm within 24 months prior to earnings 
announcement of the current quarter.24  Habitual reporters are defined as firms report 
at least 50% of zero or small positive earnings surprises out of earnings reported in 
the past 24 months. About 12% of zero and small positive earnings surprises are 
reported by habitual reporters. 
Contradicted to the conjecture, the results (not tabulated) show that the ERC for 
zero and small positive earnings surprises reported by habitual reporters is statistically 
indifferent from that reported by occasional reporters. The likely reason is that 
although firms that constantly report a zero or small positive earnings surprise is more 
likely to be manipulators, these firms also have lower earnings volatility, which 
increases ERC. Overall, it is hard to tell whether firms that constantly report a zero or 
small positive earnings surprise will have a lower or higher ERC than occasional 
reporters of zero or small positive earnings surprises. 
 
5.2 Further Evidence  
I also investigate the possibility that my results are not explained by investors seeing a 
zero or small positive earnings surprise as a red flag on the earnings announcement 
date, but rather by investors relying on other methods to identify manipulators. 
                                                        
24
 I also try 12 months and 36 months calculation periods, results are similar. 
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Results in Bartov et al. (2002) suggest the ERC is lower for firms with a downward 
trajectory of analyst earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement – a sign of 
analyst expectations management. This result would translate into a lower ERC for 
earnings surprises in the [0, 1¢] range in my test, if firms with a downward trajectory 
of analyst earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement report earnings 
surprises in the [0, 1¢] range more often than other firms. Also, based on abnormal 
returns accumulated until 50 days after the earnings announcement, results in Bartov 
et al. (2002) suggest the ERC is lower for firms with positive discretionary accruals 
estimated from Jones type models – a sign of earnings management. This result would 
translate into a lower ERC for earnings surprises in the [0, 1¢] range in my test, if 
firms with positive discretionary accruals report earnings surprises in the [0, 1¢] range 
more often than other firms and if investors have access to balance sheet data on the 
earnings announcement date.      
My test results therefore may be explained by my failure to control for the 
trajectory of analyst earnings forecasts before the earnings announcement and the sign 
of estimated discretionary accruals from Jones type models, rather than by investors 
seeing a zero or small positive earnings surprise as a red flag in and of itself. To 
investigate the possibility, I include discretionary accruals estimated from Jones type 
models and the change in analyst earnings expectations in my regression as additional 
variables. If investors see a zero or small positive earnings surprise as a red flag in 
and of itself, the ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises should remain 
smaller than those for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges after I control for these 
additional variables. My new regression model is as follows: 
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''']1,1[                         
        -------------(5) 
Where: 
ES’= ES/P, or earnings surprise scaled by share price. 
Dk=earnings surprises range dummy, equal to 1 if eanrings surprises are in range k, 
and zero otherwise. 
PDA = discretionary accruals dummy, equal to 1 if estimated discretionary accruals 
are positive, and zero otherwise;  
TEF = trajectory of analyst earnings forecast dummy, equal to 1 if the trajectory is 
downward before earnings announcement date, and zero otherwise. The 
trajectory is considered downward if the last consensus analyst forecast before 
earnings announcement of quarter t is lower than the first consensus analyst 
forecast after the earnings announcement of quarter t-1. 
I replace ES/P by ES’ in Regression (5) to reduce the number of variable symbols 







β  is included in the regression to control for the 
possible change in the ERC for each of the 14 earnings surprise ranges in cases where 







'β  is added to the regression to control for the 
possible change in the ERC for each of the 14 earnings surprises ranges in cases 
where the earnings announcement is preceded by analyst forecasts management by 
firms. I introduce these new variables in the equation to see whether the ERC for 
earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range that are associated with neither positive 
discretionary accruals nor downward analyst forecast trajectory is lower than the 
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ERCs for earnings surprises in the adjacent ranges that are also associated with 
neither positive discretionary accruals nor downward analyst forecast trajectory. If 
that is indeed the case, this would suggest that investors see a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise as a red flag in and of itself. That is, the fact that the firm reports a 
zero or small positive earnings surprise has incremental information content about 
whether manipulation has occurred over and above other signs of manipulation.  
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where TTACit is total accruals taken by firm i in quarter t (net income before 
extraordinary items minus cash flow from operations); ASTit-1 is total assets of firm i 
at the end of quarter t-1; ∆REVit is the change in net revenues for firm i in quarter t 
from quarter t-1; ∆RECit is the change in receivables in quarter t from quarter t-1; 
PPEit is the gross book value of property, plant and equipment of firm i at the end of 
quarter t; ROAt is net income before extraordinary items in quarter t scaled by total 
assets at the end of quarter t-1; Q4  is a dummy variable, equal to 1 if quarter t is the 
4th fiscal quarter for firm i and 0 otherwise.25  
I estimate the modified Jones model with current ROA annually for each SIC two-
digit industry, pooling data across quarters in the year and across firms in the industry. 
The variable Q4 is included in the regression as prior research shows that the 4th 
                                                        
25
 Similar models are used by Ashbaugh et al. (2003) and Kothari et al. (2005). Adding current ROA to the 
modified Jones model removes the dependency of estimates of discretionary accruals from the modified Jones 
model on current ROA. I also use other Jones type models, with or without ROA, to estimate discretionary 
accruals and the results are similar.   
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quarter may be different from the other fiscal quarters due to increased auditor 
scrutiny and firms’ tendency to report special items in that quarter (Francis et al. 
1996). The annual regression residuals are my estimates of discretionary accruals for 
the firms in the quarters of the year. The mean and median discretionary accruals are 0 
and 0.01 respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.08. I delete the top and bottom 
1% of discretionary accruals to avoid the effect of outliers.26  
I calculate the trajectory of analyst forecasts before the earnings announcement by 
comparing the latest analyst consensus forecast before the earnings announcement 
date with the first analyst consensus forecast after the announcement for the previous 
quarter’s earnings. If the latest consensus forecast is lower (higher) than the earlier 
consensus forecast, TEF equals to 1 (0).  
Regression (5) may be biased towards the null. Proportionately more firms 
reporting zero or small positive earnings surprises are manipulators of accruals than 
firms reporting earnings surprises in other ranges, as prior research shows. Some of 
the penalty for firms with zero or small positive earnings surprises therefore is likely 
to be captured by the coefficient on the discretionary accruals variable although 
investors in most cases do not have access to balance sheet data on the earnings 
announcement date, which are needed to estimate discretionary accruals from Jones 
type models. The results of Regression (5) therefore may be biased against finding the 
ERC on earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range to be lower than ERCs for earnings 
surprises in adjacent ranges.  
<------ Insert Table 5.8 here -----> 
The results of Regression (5) are presented in Table 5.8. For simplicity, instead of 
                                                        
26
 The result is almost the same if I do not delete extreme values. 
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reporting the coefficient on the PDA dummy for each of the earnings surprises, I 
report average coefficients on PDA dummies in earnings surprises ranges greater than 
1 cent (denoted as ES’(>1¢)×  PDA), and average coefficients on PDA dummies in 
negative earnings surprises ranges (denoted as ES’(<0¢) ×  PDA). The average 
coefficients on ES’(>1¢) × PDA are significantly negative across the three sample 
periods, suggesting that positive discretionary accruals exaggerate the amount of 
positive earnings surprises, and depress the ERC for positive earnings surprises. The 
coefficients on ES’(<0¢)×PDA are positive but only significant in the sample period 
from 1992-1997. My result is generally consistent with the findings in Defond and 
Park (2001).27  The coefficients on ES’(>1¢)×PDA for the full sample and the two 
subsamples are much larger than those on ES’(<0¢) × PDA in absolute value, 
suggesting the penalty for positive discretionary accruals is greater for firms reporting 
positive earnings surprises than for firms reporting negative earnings surprises. The 
possible reason is that firms reporting positive earnings surprises and positive 
discretionary accruals are more likely to be engaged in earnings management than 
firms reporting negative earnings surprises and positive discretionary accruals. 
Similarly, I report average coefficients on TEF dummies in earnings surprises 
ranges greater than 1 cent (denoted as ES’(>1¢)×  TEF), and the average coefficients 
on TEF dummies in negative earnings surprises ranges (denoted as ES’(<0¢) ×  
TEF).Consistent with my expectation, the coefficients on ES’(>1¢) ×  TEF are 
negative and the coefficients on ES’(<0¢) ×  TEF are positive in all three samples. 
These results suggest that downward analyst forecast trajectory reduces the ERC for 
positive earnings surprises and increases the ERC for negative earnings surprises; i.e., 
                                                        
27
 Defond and Park (2001) show that abnormal positive working capital accruals depress the ERC for positive 
earnings surprises and raise the ERC for negative earnings surprises. However, they fail to find consistent evidence 
using discretionary accruals estimated from Jones model. Their sample period is from 1992-1995. 
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downward analyst forecast trajectory reduces the cumulative abnormal returns for 
both positive and negative earnings surprises.  
More importantly, after the effects of earnings management and analyst forecast 
guidance are controlled for, the ERC for earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range is lower 
than the ERCs for earnings surprises in the (1¢, 2¢] and [-1¢, 0) ranges, and lower 
than the average of the two ERCs. The difference is significant in each case for the 
full sample and for the 1998-2004 subsample, but not for the 1992-1997 subsample. 
These results suggest a zero or small positive earnings surprise is treated as a separate 
signal by investors, and it increases investors’ estimate of the chance that earnings 
and/or analyst expectations management has occurred to a higher level than is 
justified by other signs of manipulation. A zero or small positive earnings surprise is 
treated as a separate signal because it subsumes other methods of earnings 
management not captured in discretionary accruals. Prior studies show evidence of 
earnings management through managing R&D expense (Cheng 2004, Bushee 1998). 
Managers can simply cut or postpone R&D investment in anticipation of failing to 
meet analyst forecasts. Roychowdhury (2005) presents evidence of manipulating real 
activities. These activities include price discounts to temporarily boost sales, 
overproduction to report lower cost of goods sold, and reduction of discretionary 
expenditures. McVay (2006) shows that managers can shift between core earnings and 
special items in order to meet or beat analyst forecasts. These non-accrual earnings 
management methods may be as common as manipulating accruals since accruals 
manipulation requires changing accounting assumptions, which would require auditor 
approval. Papers by Zang (2005), and Bartov and Cohen (2007) show evidence that 
managers tend to manipulate real activity before choosing accrual management.  
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Therefore, rational investors may suspect that zero or small positive earnings surprises 
are achieved through non-accrual earnings management and therefore associate a 
smaller ERC to these surprises. As there are no reliable ways of detecting earnings 
management that can happen in many venues, investors adopt a simpler heuristic to 
identify these cases. 
 
5.3 Analyst Forecasts Revisions  
If investors are more skeptical of a zero or small positive earnings surprise in 
identifying possible manipulators, analysts should do the same. They are likely to 
revise upward their forecasts for next-quarter earnings after the current-quarter 
earnings announcement proportionately less in zero or small positive earnings 
surprises than in other cases, or even revise the forecasts for next-quarter earnings 
downward. I test the hypothesis by comparing the relation between next-quarter 
earnings revisions and the current-quarter earnings surprise across ranges of earnings 








tkkt PESDPFR εβα ;   ------------ (6) 
Where FRt+1 is analyst forecast revisions of the next quarter’s earnings, defined as 
the difference between the first consensus analyst forecast for quarter t+1 issued after 
earnings announcement of quarter t and the last consensus analyst forecast for quarter 
t+1 issued before earning announcement of quarter t . The price is the closing price 
one day before I/B/E/S consensus calculation date28. Other variables are as defined 
previously.  
<------ Insert Table 5.9 here -----> 
                                                        
28
 The result is qualitatively similar if using actual earnings per share as a deflator. 
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I report the result of Regression (6) for all the sample firm-quarters, and the 1992-
1997 and 1998-2004 subsamples in Tables 5.9. For the full sample as expected, there 
is a positive relation between analyst revisions of forecast of next quarter’s earnings 
and current quarter’s earnings surprise in all earnings surprise ranges. The only 
exception is earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range. The coefficient for earnings 
surprises in [0, 1¢] range is -0.17 and statistically significant. F-statistics show that 
this coefficient is significantly lower than the coefficient for earnings surprises in the 
(1¢, 2¢] range (p- value lower than 1%). This result is consistent with analyst 
skepticism against a zero or small positive earnings surprise. To understand why the 
revision-surprise relation for zero and small positive earnings surprises is negative 
rather than zero, note that to the extent that analysts suspect that a zero or small 
positive earnings surprise in the current quarter is achieved by the firm borrowing 
revenues from or deferring expenses to the next quarter, they are likely to lower their 
earnings expectations for the next quarter. If analysts suspect that larger earnings 
surprises in the [0,1¢] range are more affected by revenue acceleration and/or expense 
deferment to the next quarter than others in the range, the overall revision-surprise 
relation for earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range will be negative.  
The ERCs for positive earnings surprises are generally lower than those for 
negative earnings surprises. The result is consistent with the reported general 
tendency of analysts to revise optimistic earning forecasts downward over time 
(O’Brien 1988; Gleason and Lee 2003). The tendency is linked to analysts first 
issuing optimistic earnings forecasts and then lowering their estimates to the level that 
the firms can beat prior to the earnings announcement (Richardson et al. 1999). As a 
result of the gradual downward shifting of earnings forecasts by analysts, the 
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distribution of 1+tFR  in my sample is skewed to the left, and only about 24% of the 
values of 1+tFR are positive. Therefore, forecast revisions for the next quarter’s 
earnings after the earnings announcement of the current quarter can be decomposed 
into two parts, revisions in response to information contained in the earnings 
announcement, and downward revisions to correct previous optimism. The existence 
of the second component means each unit of negative earnings surprise is associated 
with a large negative forecast revision for the following quarter, resulting in a large 
ERC. The existence of the second component, on the other hand, means each unit of 
positive earnings surprise is associated with a small positive or even negative forecast 
revision for the following quarter, resulting in a small or zero ERC. Nevertheless, the 
ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises is significantly lower than the 
ERCs for larger positive earnings surprises, consistent with the notion that analysts 
are also skeptical of a zero or small positive earnings surprise.  
Note that the negative revision-surprise relation for zero and small positive 
earnings surprises does not contradict my earlier result that while the ERC for such 
earnings surprises is smaller than those for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges, it 
remains positive. Stock price reflects both the current-quarter earnings and 
expectations of future earnings, including those of the next quarter. A zero or small 
positive earnings surprise in the current quarter achieved by the firm borrowing 
revenues from or deferring expenses to the next quarter would probably have a mild 
impact on the combined earnings of the current and next quarters, and therefore a 
relatively mild impact on stock price at the earnings announcement for the current 
quarter.  
The coefficients for zero and small positive earnings surprises in the two 
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subsamples are somewhat different. The coefficient for zero and small positive 
earnings surprises in subsample 1998-2004 is -0.20, statistically negative and lower 
than the coefficient for earnings surprises in the (1¢, 2¢] range (p- value lower than 
1%), whereas the coefficient for zero and small positive earnings surprises in the 
subsmaple 1992-1998 is not significantly different from zero and not significantly 
different from the coefficient for earnings surprises in the (1¢, 2¢] range. These results 
suggest that analysts see a zero or small positive earnings surprise as more of a red 
flag in the period of 1998-2004. 
I conduct an additional test to see whether the result holds after controlling for the 
sign of estimated discretionary accruals and the trajectory analyst earnings forecasts 
before the earnings announcement. I do so by running the following regression: 















1 '''/ -----(7) 
 
The variables are as defined previously. If analysts see a zero or small positive 
earnings surprise as a red flag in and of itself, the coefficient for zero and small 
positive surprises should remain lower than those for earnings surprises in adjacent 
ranges. 
<------ Insert Table 5.10 here -----> 
The estimation results are reported in Table 5.10. The coefficients on control 
variables in positive earnings surprises are all negative and mostly statistically 
significant, suggesting a less favorable analyst response towards positive earnings 
surprises achieved through earnings and/or analyst expectations management. The 
coefficients on ES’[0,1¢]) × TEF are all significantly larger than the average 
coefficientss on ES’(>1¢) × TEF in absolute value, suggesting the penalty for 
downward analyst forecast trajectory is greater for firms that report zero and small 
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earnings surprises than for firms that report earnings surprises greater than 1 cent. The 
possible reason is that analysts regard firms reporting zero and small positive earnings 
surprises and downward analyst forecast trajectory are more likely to be engaged in 
forecast management than firms reporting greater earnings surprises and downward 
analyst forecast trajectory. 
My focus is that whether the coefficient for zero and small positive earnings 
surprises remains lower in this regression. As Table 5.10 shows, the coefficient for 
earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range is negative and lower than the coefficient for 
earnings surprises in the (1¢, 2¢] range. The difference is significant for both the full 
sample and the 1998-2004 subsample, but not for the 1992-1997 subsample. These 
results suggest a zero or small earnings surprise in and of itself is seen as a red flag by 
analysts, and firms reporting such earnings surprises are penalized by analysts even if 
there are no other signs of manipulation.  
In sum, the regression analysis using analysts forecast revisions for the following 
quarter as the dependent variable shows results very similar to those using 3-day CAR 
around earnings announcement date. Therefore, these tests provide additional 
evidence that analysts respond unfavorably to zero or small earnings surprises as 
investors do. 
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TABLE 5.1 





 (1992-1997)  
Sub-Period2  
(1998-2004) 
       
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00 6.82  0.00 2.83  0.00 4.28 
CAR[-20,-2] 
-0.04 -24.67  -0.03 -14.91  -0.04 -19.59 
ES/P for ES in 
        
 (<-8¢) 0.39 25.64  0.36 17.75  0.40 18.26 
 [-8¢,-6¢) 1.13 11.82  1.32 9.47  0.98 7.47 
 [-6¢,-4¢) 1.52 13.62  1.51 8.83  1.49 10.03 
 [-4¢,-3¢) 2.44 12.29  2.41 7.92  2.39 9.08 
 [-3¢,-2¢) 2.35 10.44  1.33 3.97  2.86 9.45 
 [-2¢,-1¢) 3.74 12.53  3.34 7.44  3.82 9.59 
 [-1¢,0) 5.39 10.56  4.03 4.94  5.78 8.74 
[0,1¢] 1.02 2.27  5.67 7.12  -0.38 -0.68 
(1¢,2¢] 2.69 10.14  5.71 11.35  1.91 5.91 
(2¢,3¢] 2.34 10.94  5.39 13.30  1.51 5.79 
(3¢,4¢] 2.22 11.50  3.12 9.85  1.90 7.68 
(4¢,6¢] 2.05 16.35  3.00 13.87  1.73 11.03 
(6¢,8¢] 1.79 14.14  2.72 12.01  1.51 9.59 
(>8¢) 1.27 24.92  1.39 18.97  1.22 17.46 
Adj.R-sq 0.03   0.03   0.04  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.38   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) <0.01   0.16   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 










kka PESDCARCAR εββα ;   ------------ (1) 
Earnings surprise classes: 
R
-7: Earnings surprises less than -8¢ (-8 cents per share); 
R
-6: Earnings surprises greater or equal to -8¢ , and less than -6c, denoted as ES[-8¢ , -6¢); 
R
-5: ES[-6¢,-4¢) R-4: ES[-4¢,-3¢) R-3: ES[-3¢,-2¢) R-2: ES[-2¢,-1¢) R-1: ES[-1¢,0¢)   R0: ES(0,1¢] 
R1: ES(1¢,2¢] R2: ES(2¢,3¢] R3: ES(3¢,4¢] R4: ES(4¢,6¢] R5: ES(6¢,8¢] R6: ES(>8¢) 
Dk: Dummy variable, k= -7,-6,-5……5,6, equal to one if earnings surprise is in Class Rk and zero 
otherwise. 
Other variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 5.2 














kka PESDCARCAR εββα ;   ------------ (1) 





β  6−β  5−β  4−β  3−β  2−β  1−β  0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  6β  Adj-R2 0β - 1−β  0β - 1β  
1992 0.18 1.41 -0.24 2.04 0.22 1.73 3.35 7.00 3.21 6.05 3.40 2.08 4.24 1.54 0.04 3.65 3.79* 
1993 0.23 2.21 2.20 3.10 2.67 2.74 1.06 3.47 4.51 3.72 2.73 4.15 2.65 1.48 0.03 2.41 -1.05 
1994 0.31 1.18 1.33 1.99 1.79 2.36 2.06 7.80 9.17 5.30 3.31 2.52 2.47 1.69 0.03 5.74** -1.38 
1995 0.26 1.49 1.65 1.55 0.87 2.99 4.28 1.92 4.28 4.51 2.70 3.36 2.20 0.88 0.03 -2.36 -2.36 
1996 0.58 1.10 2.10 2.10 1.55 4.10 9.84 7.87 6.31 5.65 2.93 3.80 2.15 1.50 0.02 -1.96 1.56 
1997 0.52 1.16 2.13 3.64 1.07 4.89 4.38 5.65 6.67 6.17 3.42 2.92 3.29 1.33 0.03 1.27 -1.02 
1998 0.31 1.09 1.55 1.52 3.63 5.46 0.67 2.65 3.51 3.58 3.96 2.33 2.33 1.08 0.04 1.98 -0.86 
1999 0.30 0.81 1.06 2.38 3.25 3.26 7.91 2.95 3.91 4.03 2.07 2.60 1.46 1.26 0.04 -4.95* -0.95 
2000 0.51 1.45 1.47 3.46 3.97 3.06 4.87 1.69 4.56 3.20 3.81 0.66 1.29 0.81 0.05 -3.18* -2.88** 
2001 0.32 0.65 1.45 0.88 1.24 2.35 7.13 -0.61 2.09 -0.01 1.47 1.28 0.80 0.98 0.03 -7.74*** -2.70** 
2002 0.46 0.48 1.36 2.27 3.19 3.24 3.43 -2.11 0.06 0.81 1.48 1.11 1.82 1.26 0.04 -5.54*** -2.17* 
2003 0.56 1.27 1.60 3.89 2.14 4.33 4.13 -0.74 2.32 1.42 0.63 2.77 1.82 1.75 0.03 -4.87*** -3.06** 
2004 0.52 1.47 1.91 2.81 2.48 4.27 13.38 -0.07 0.91 1.38 3.05 3.22 2.84 1.74 0.03 -13.44*** -0.97 
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TABLE 5.3 





Variables Coef. t-stat 
Intercept 0.00 6.82 
CAR[-20,-2] 
-0.04 -24.67 
ES/P for ES in 
  
 (<-8¢) 0.39 6.45 
 [-8¢,-6¢) 1.13 -24.72 
 [-6¢,-4¢) 1.52 25.56 
 [-4¢,-3¢) 2.43 11.77 
 [-3¢,-2¢) 2.34 13.57 
 [-2¢,-1¢) 3.72 12.24 
 [-1¢,0) 5.35 10.38 
[0,1¢] 6.65 12.47 
(1¢,2¢] 2.72 10.23 
(2¢,3¢] 2.36 11.01 
(3¢,4¢] 2.23 11.57 
(4¢,6¢] 2.06 16.41 
(6¢,8¢] 1.80 14.2 
(>8¢) 1.27 25.01 
Time Trend×  ES’[0,1¢]) 
-0.73 -5.84 










kka PESDCARCAR ββα  ES’[0,1¢]+ε ;   ------- (2) 
ES’[0,1¢]= ES/P, or earnings surprise scaled by share price in zero or one cent range, and zero 
otherwise. 
t: sample years minus sample begin year 1992. It takes value from zero for the year 1992 and 13 for the 
year 2004. 
R
-7: Earnings surprises less than -8¢ (-8 cents per share); 
R
-6: Earnings surprises greater or equal to -8¢ , and less than -6c, denoted as ES[-8¢ , -6¢); 
R
-5: ES[-6¢,-4¢) R-4: ES[-4¢,-3¢) R-3: ES[-3¢,-2¢) R-2: ES[-2¢,-1¢) R-1: ES[-1¢,0¢)   R0: ES[0,1¢] 
R1: ES(1¢,2¢] R2: ES(2¢,3¢] R3: ES(3¢,4¢] R4: ES(4¢,6¢] R5: ES(6¢,8¢] R6: ES(>8¢) 
Dk: Dummy variable, k= -7,-6,-5……5,6, equal to one if earnings surprise is in Class Rk and zero 
otherwise. 
Other variables are as defined in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 5.4 
Non-linear Surprises-Return Regression  
 
 
Model :  +××+×+×+=
−−−
PESPESPESCARCAR /|/|/ 32)2,20(10)1,20( ββββ εβ +×× PESMNB /4 ------------------(3) 
  0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  Adj.R-sq 
 
Full sample (1992-2004)   
Coefficients  0.00 -0.04 2.12 -19.95 -2.18 0.04 
t-statistics  14.64 -26.34 59.46 -39.96 -6.20  
  
     
 
 
Sub period (1992-1997)  
Coefficients  0.00 -0.04 2.12 -20.31 0.64 0.04 
t-statistics  14.87 -15.84 43.02 -29.08 0.90  
  
     
 
 
Sub period (1998-2004)  
Coefficients  0.00 -0.04 2.15 -19.98 -2.79 0.03 
t-statistics  6.57 -20.76 42.32 -28.46 -6.63  
 
Note: 
MNB: Dummy variable equal to 1 if earnings surprise is in the [0, 1¢] range, and zero otherwise  
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TABLE 5.5 









       
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00 5.32  0.00 3.52  0.00 2.39 
CAR[-20,-2] 
-0.04 -24.44  -0.05 -16.63  -0.04 -18.44 
ES/P for ES in 
        
 (<-8¢) 1.65 22.77  1.58 15.97  1.68 16.06 
 [-8¢,-6¢) 2.08 17.30  2.21 12.50  1.99 12.19 
 [-6¢,-4¢) 2.35 18.16  2.33 11.60  2.34 13.55 
 [-4¢,-3¢) 2.81 14.26  2.27 7.58  3.03 11.62 
 [-3¢,-2¢) 2.43 10.19  1.56 4.01  2.75 8.95 
 [-2¢,-1¢) 3.72 12.45  3.16 6.94  3.92 9.93 
 [-1¢,0) 4.84 10.82  3.10 4.10  5.37 9.51 
[0,1¢] 1.11 2.54  4.12 5.02  0.47 0.87 
(1¢,2¢] 2.72 9.35  5.30 9.41  2.16 6.12 
(2¢,3¢] 3.10 12.37  5.15 11.00  2.61 8.47 
(3¢,4¢] 3.14 12.90  3.63 9.57  2.98 9.33 
(4¢,6¢] 3.39 19.74  3.84 13.98  3.24 14.51 
(6¢,8¢] 3.14 16.66  3.56 12.12  2.98 12.06 
(>8¢) 2.24 24.33  2.51 19.39  2.08 16.30 
M/B dum.× ES/P 0.32 6.26  0.35 4.91  0.31 4.15 
Size dum.×ES/P 0.62 7.76  -0.14 -1.18  1.08 10.06 
Earnings volatility dum.×ES/P 
-0.26 -5.20  -0.23 -3.48  -0.28 -3.92 
Earnings persistency dum.×ES/P 0.45 8.17  0.51 6.06  0.45 6.22 
Average growth rate dum.× ES/P 0.11 2.64  0.17 2.90  0.06 1.01 
No. of analyst dum.×ES/P 0.08 1.65  0.02 0.25  0.12 1.87 
Loss dum.×ES/P 
-1.29 -19.96  -1.22 -14.02  -1.31 -14.08 
Adj.R-sq 0.04   0.05   0.04  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.37   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) <0.01   0.22   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 
=ERC[-1¢,0)+ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.36   <0.01  
         
 
(Continued on next page) 
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kka PESDCARCAR ββα + 8β ( M/B dum.× ES/P 9β+ (Size 
dum.×ES/P)+ 10β (Earnings volatility dum.×ES/P)+ 11β  (Earnings persistency dum.×ES/P) 
+ 12β (Growth dum.×ES/P)  + 13β (No. of analyst dum.×ES/P) + 14β (Loss dum.×ES/P) +ε  
……………………………………………(4)  
        
where: 
 
Market to book dummy = 1 if market to book ratio is above the sample median and 0 otherwise 
 
Size dummy=1 if market value of firm at the end of the quarter is above the sample median and 0 
otherwise 
 
Earnings volatility dummy = 1 if variance of ROE over the past five years is above the ample median 
and 0 otherwise 
 
Earnings persistency dummy = 1 if )1( θ−  is above the sample median and 0 otherwise. θ is from the 
estimation of time series model 11 −− ×−+= YYYY EPSEPS εθε . EPS data 
from 1988 to 2004 are used to estimate the parameterθ  
 
Growth dummy=1 if average growth rate in book value of equity over past three years is above the 
sample median and 0 otherwise  
 
No. of analyst dummy= 1 if the number of analysts following the stock tracked by the I/B/E/S is above 
the sample median and 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 5.6 
Regression of CAR on the Earnings Surprise  









       
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00 5.66  0.00 2.17  0.00 3.83 
ES/P for ES in 
        
 (<-8¢) 0.48 27.37  0.43 18.96  0.53 19.73 
 [-8¢,-6¢) 1.56 14.33  1.73 11.16  1.41 9.42 
 [-6¢,-4¢) 1.63 13.26  1.33 7.55  1.77 10.50 
 [-4¢,-3¢) 2.31 10.86  2.74 8.77  2.00 6.91 
 [-3¢,-2¢) 3.16 13.06  2.57 7.34  3.46 10.41 
 [-2¢,-1¢) 4.15 12.69  3.76 8.06  4.29 9.47 
 [-1¢,0) 5.72 10.70  5.99 7.41  5.36 7.50 
[0,1¢] 1.76 3.89  5.62 7.56  0.32 0.54 
(1¢,2¢] 2.97 11.33  4.52 9.73  2.53 7.69 
(2¢,3¢] 2.90 13.52  5.63 14.80  2.03 7.58 
(3¢,4¢] 2.73 14.04  3.86 11.71  2.34 9.47 
(4¢,6¢] 2.22 17.45  2.55 13.02  2.10 12.43 
(6¢,8¢] 1.73 14.13  2.90 13.03  1.38 9.08 
(>8¢) 1.22 27.69  1.29 21.06  1.19 19.24 
Adj.R-sq 0.03   0.03   0.03  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] 0.02   0.19   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) <0.01   0.37   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 
=ERC[-1¢,0)+ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.34   <0.01  




This table reports results of estimation of Regression (1) using an alternative measure of analyst 
earnings expectation: the most recent single analyst forecasts. Earnings surprises are defined as 
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TABLE 5.7 
Regression of CAR on the Earnings Surprise  






 (1992-1997)  
Sub-Period2 
 (1998-2004) 
       
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00 4.16  0.00 6.23  0.00 0.17 
CAR[-20,-2] 
-0.03 -27.33  -0.03 -16.31  -0.03 -21.60 
ES/|actual EPS| for ES in 
        
 (<-8¢) 0.01 31.42  0.01 24.57  0.01 20.95 
 [-8¢,-6¢) 0.01 12.67  0.01 9.78  0.02 8.65 
 [-6¢,-4¢) 0.02 14.20  0.01 10.00  0.02 10.50 
 [-4¢,-3¢) 0.02 11.10  0.02 9.09  0.02 7.04 
 [-3¢,-2¢) 0.01 8.53  0.01 3.98  0.02 7.73 
 [-2¢,-1¢) 0.02 9.34  0.02 6.74  0.02 6.67 
 [-1¢,0) 0.03 10.13  0.03 6.06  0.04 8.00 
[0,1¢] 0.00 0.19  0.01 3.17  0.00 -1.32 
(1¢,2¢] 0.03 11.73  0.03 8.55  0.02 8.69 
(2¢,3¢] 0.04 15.67  0.04 11.62  0.03 11.25 
(3¢,4¢] 0.04 17.27  0.04 10.60  0.05 13.57 
(4¢,6¢] 0.05 21.78  0.05 14.91  0.05 16.22 
(6¢,8¢] 0.05 20.52  0.05 13.84  0.05 15.31 
(>8¢) 0.04 30.95  0.04 22.55  0.04 21.89 
Adj.R-sq 0.03   0.04   0.03  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.04   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) <0.01   <0.01   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 
=ERC[-1¢,0)+ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   <0.01   <0.01  










kka actualsESDCARCAR εββα ;    
This table reports results using actual earnings per share as a scaling factor. The partition scheme is the 
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TABLE 5.8 
Regression of CAR on the Earnings Surprise Controlling for the Effects of 






 (1992-1997)  
Sub-Period2  
(1998-2004) 
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
         
Intercept 0.00 4.05  0.00 1.25  0.00 2.13 
CAR[-20,-2] 
-0.03 -27.06  -0.03 -16.42  -0.04 -21.50 
ES/P for ES in 
        
(<-8¢) 0.53 19.08  0.47 12.71  0.57 14.08 
[-8¢,-6¢) 1.04 8.83  1.10 6.06  1.00 6.38 
[-6¢,-4¢) 1.09 9.46  1.29 6.39  1.00 6.93 
[-4¢,-3¢) 1.01 5.71  2.10 5.45  0.77 3.69 
[-3¢,-2¢) 0.84 3.64  0.55 1.38  0.91 3.11 
[-2¢,-1¢) 2.54 8.17  1.88 3.84  2.81 6.86 
[-1¢,0) 2.61 6.03  3.23 3.35  2.41 4.74 
[0,1¢] 1.15 2.77  4.68 5.36  0.44 0.89 
(1¢,2¢] 2.86 9.85  5.61 9.87  2.26 6.44 
(2¢,3¢] 3.37 13.42  6.29 13.53  2.58 8.34 
(3¢,4¢] 3.02 12.12  3.88 9.42  2.71 8.51 
(4¢,6¢] 2.90 17.33  3.31 11.94  2.80 13.09 
(6¢,8¢] 3.10 16.95  3.16 11.13  3.12 12.94 
(>8¢) 2.15 29.22  2.14 20.90  2.21 21.30 
Control variables 
        
ES’[0,1¢]×PDA 
-1.99 -2.74  -2.04 -1.48  -2.11 -2.38 
ES’[0,1¢]) ×TEF 
-0.02 -0.03  2.78 2.03  -1.04 -1.18 
ES’(>1¢)×PDA 
-1.20 -3.64  -0.69 -1.00  -1.37 -3.46 
ES’(>1¢) ×TEF 
-0.45 -1.87  -0.43 -0.88  -0.58 -1.84 
ES’(<0¢) ×PDA 0.19 0.36  -0.20 -0.28  0.33 0.47 
ES’(<0¢)×TEF 0.72 2.12  0.65 1.37  0.66 1.44 
Adj.R-sq 0.03   0.04   0.03  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.37   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) <0.01   0.12   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 
=ERC[-1¢,0)+ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.41   <0.01  
Note:  
















ES’= ES/P, or earnings surprise scaled by share price. 
Dk=earnings surprises range dummy, equal to 1 if eanrings surprises are in range k, and zero otherwise. 
PDA: discretionary accruals dummy, equal to 1 if discretionary accruals are positive, and zero 
otherwise 
TEF: trajectory of analyst earnings forecast dummy, equal to 1 the trajectory is downward  
   before the earnings announcement, and zero otherwise.
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TABLE 5.9 
Regression of Forecast Revisions for Next Quarter  






 (1992-1997)  
Sub-Period2  
(1998-2004) 
 N=109,156  N=46,228  N=62,928 
      
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00 -43.70  0.00 -23.84  0.00 -37.93 
ES/P for ES in 
        
 (<-8¢) 0.12 85.79  0.11 57.00  0.13 64.60 
 [-8¢,-6¢) 0.34 41.32  0.29 23.71  0.37 33.22 
 [-6¢,-4¢) 0.39 40.71  0.43 27.35  0.37 30.29 
 [-4¢,-3¢) 0.40 25.42  0.45 16.64  0.38 19.06 
 [-3¢,-2¢) 0.47 26.50  0.36 12.58  0.51 22.36 
 [-2¢,-1¢) 0.56 23.07  0.46 12.25  0.59 18.75 
 [-1¢,0) 0.90 22.45  0.67 9.77  0.96 18.97 
[0,1¢] 
-0.17 -4.96  0.06 0.99  -0.20 -4.66 
(1¢,2¢] 0.01 0.54  0.07 1.63  0.02 0.85 
(2¢,3¢] 0.04 2.41  0.08 2.48  0.04 2.19 
(3¢,4¢] 0.06 3.58  0.06 2.26  0.07 3.35 
(4¢,6¢] 0.06 5.79  0.02 0.90  0.08 6.38 
(6¢,8¢] 0.03 3.27  0.07 3.67  0.03 2.29 
(>8¢) 0.05 12.95  0.04 7.38  0.06 11.07 
Adj.R-sq 0.10   0.10   0.11  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.47   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) <0.01   <0.01   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 
=ERC[-1¢,0)+ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   <0.01   <0.01  










tkkt PESDPFR εβα ;   ------------ (6) 
FRt+1: The first consensus analyst forecast for quarter t+1 issued after earnings announcement of 
quarter t minus the last Consensus analyst forecast for quarter t+1 issue before earning announcement 
of quarter t. 
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TABLE 5.10 
Regression of Forecast Revisions for Next Quarter on the Earnings Surprise of 
Current Quarter Controlling for the Effects of Positive Discretionary Accruals 






 (1992-1997)  
Sub-Period2  
(1998-2004) 
 N=69,732  N=30,085  N=39,647 
Variables Coef. t-stat  Coef. t-stat.  Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.00 -42.33  0.00 -22.97  0.00 -37.27 
ES/P for ES in 
        
(<-8¢) 0.11 49.58  0.09 27.63  0.12 40.34 
[-8¢,-6¢) 0.37 27.88  0.30 14.90  0.39 22.49 
[-6¢,-4¢) 0.33 24.30  0.37 14.23  0.32 18.86 
[-4¢,-3¢) 0.35 14.78  0.26 5.94  0.37 12.88 
[-3¢,-2¢) 0.41 15.70  0.18 4.13  0.47 14.62 
[-2¢,-1¢) 0.44 13.09  0.32 5.88  0.47 10.87 
[-1¢,0) 0.65 11.59  0.30 2.84  0.72 10.41 
[0,1¢] 0.01 0.25  0.32 3.50  -0.01 -0.19 
(1¢,2¢] 0.12 4.36  0.22 3.73  0.13 3.89 
(2¢,3¢] 0.12 5.42  0.17 3.90  0.13 4.73 
(3¢,4¢] 0.06 2.75  0.06 1.45  0.07 2.82 
(4¢,6¢] 0.12 8.95  0.08 3.07  0.15 8.73 
(6¢,8¢] 0.10 7.28  0.16 5.82  0.10 5.48 
(>8¢) 0.10 16.57  0.09 10.04  0.11 13.66 
Control variables 
        
ES’[0,1¢]×PDA 
-0.03 -0.35  -0.17 -1.30  -0.01 -0.13 
ES’[0,1¢]) ×TEF 
-0.64 -9.02  -0.55 -4.42  -0.72 -8.09 
ES’(>1¢)×PDA 
-0.02 -1.26  -0.01 -0.32  -0.03 -1.26 
ES’(>1¢) ×TEF 
-0.20 -7.73  -0.19 -4.60  -0.20 -6.19 
ES’(<0¢) ×PDA 
-0.02 -0.58  -0.01 -0.37  -0.03 -0.40 
ES’(<0¢)×  TEF 0.22 5.52  0.29 5.66  0.21 3.39 
Adj.R-sq 0.11   0.11   0.11  
F-Tests P-value   P-value   P-value  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC(1¢,2¢] <0.01   0.33   <0.01  
ERC[0,1¢]=ERC[-1¢,0) 0.04   <0.01   <0.01  
2ERC(0,1¢] 
=ERC[-1¢,0)+ERC(1¢,2¢] 0.02   <0.01   <0.01  
Note:  















1 '''/ -----(7) 
FRt+1: The first consensus analyst forecast of quarter t+1’earnings issued after earnings announcement 
of quarter t minus the last Consensus analyst forecast of quarter t+1’earnings issued before earning 
announcement of quarter t. Other variables are as defined in Table 5.8. 
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FIGURE 5.1 
Variation of ERC across Earnings Surprises Ranges  
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FIGURE 5.2 
ERC for Zero and Small Positive Earnings Surprises and the Ratio of Number of Earnings Surprises in the [-1¢, 0) Range to 

























a Left scale for ERC for zero and small positive earnings surprises  
b Right scale for the ratio of the number of earnings surprises in the [-1¢, 0) range to the number of earnings surprises in the [0,1¢] range.  











t-value:2.70; adj-R2: 0.34 





INVESTOR RESPONSE OVER THE 




Chapter 5 shows that the ERC from regressing 3-day returns around earnings 
announcement date on earning surprises is lower for zero and small positive earnings 
surprises than for earnings surprises in adjacent ranges. This result persists even after 
controlling for the effects of positive discretionary accruals and downwards forecast 
trajectory on the ERC. Since balance sheet information is generally not available on 
the date of earnings announcement, investor response to zero and small positive 
surprises around earnings announcement date is more likely due to investors seeing a 
zero or small positive earnings surprise as an indicator of possible manipulations, 
rather than due to punishment towards cases that are indeed results of earnings 
management. However, previous chapters do not answer the question whether 
investors correctly estimate the possibility that zero and small positive earnings 
surprises are results of earnings management and/or the extent to which earnings 
management contributes to these earnings surprises at the date of earnings 
announcement. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how investors respond to zero or small 
positive earnings surprises in the period subsequent to earnings announcement date, 
when the full set of financial statements is available for investors to assess the 
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possibility of earnings management more thoroughly. If investors correctly estimate 
the possibility and/or extent of earnings management at the date of earnings 
announcement, it is expected that no post-announcement abnormal returns are 
associated with zero or small positive earnings surprises.  However, if investors 
under-estimate (over-estimate) the extent and probability of  earnings management by 
firms reporting zero or small positive earnings surprises, on average, it is expected 
that the negative (positive) abnormal returns are associated with zero and small 
positive earnings surprises after earnings announcement date.29 
Prior studies show a significantly higher and increasing management’s tendency to 
meet or beat analyst forecasts starting from early 1990’s (Brown 2001; Bartov et al. 
2002; Matsumoto 2002). If investor under-react (over-react) to a zero or small 
positive earnings surprise as a result of manipulations, I expect the abnormal post-
announcement returns for zero and small positive earnings surprises to be evident in 
the sample period since early 1990’s. For comparison purpose, I also examine the 
sample period before early 1990’s, during which no significant evidence of meeting or 
beating analyst forecasts evidence is found. Therefore, I do not expect abnormal 
returns are associated with firms reporting zero or small positive earnings surprises.  
I start my analysis by plotting post-announcement market-adjusted CARs over 60 
trading days (less than a quarter). Bernard and Thomas (1989) argue that investors 
under-react to earnings news, and provide evidence that post earnings announcement 
CARs vary monotonically with earnings surprises. In other words, according to 
                                                        
29
  The abnormal returns associated with zero and small positive earnings surprises, if evidenced, are not expected 
to be results of investor’s over-estimation (under-estimation) of the possibility that analyst earnings forecasts are 
guided. First, the measure of analyst forecast trajectory which captures possible firms’ forecast guidance is 
observable to investors at the time of earnings management. Second, the full set of financial statements provides 
no information regarding whether firms have guided analyst forecasts. Firms are more likely to report zero and 
small positive earnings surprises if their earnings are less volatile and easier to forecast. Again, I do not expect any 
abnormal returns associated with zero and small positive earnings surprises if these earnings surprises are achieved 
because firms’ earnings are less volatile and easier to forecast. 
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Bernard and Thomas (1989), post-announcement CARs for even small positive 
earnings surprises drift upward. Consistent with their findings, I find that post-
announcement CAR over 60 trading days for zero and small positive earnings 
surprises drifts upward by about 2% in the 1984-1991 period.30  However, the CAR 
for zero and small positive surprise in the 1992-1997 period drifts upward by only 
0.5%. Furthermore, the CAR for zero and small positive surprise in period 1998-2004 
drifts slightly downward. This result suggests a significant shift in investor response 
to zero and small positive earnings surprises.  
I regress CARs cumulated from 2 days after earnings announcement of quarter t to 
20 days before the earnings announcement of quarter t+1 on earnings surprises for 
current quarter t (control for investor under-reaction to earnings news), market to 
book ratio, size, Beta, and MNB, a dummy variable representing zero and small 
positive surprise (meet or narrowly beat analyst forecasts).31  The coefficient on MNB 
thus captures the average market response to zero and small positive earnings 
surprises after earnings announcement for quarter t. I find significant negative 
coefficient on MNB dummy in the 1992-1997, and 1998-2004 sample periods, 
suggesting that negative average post-announcement CARs are associated with firms 
reporting zero and small positive surprises in the two sample periods after controlling 
for investors’ under-reaction to earnings information. In contrast, I do not find 
significant negative coefficients on MNB dummies for the sample period from 1984-
1991. It seems that investors react unfavorably to firms reporting zero or small 
positive earnings surprises, when balance sheet information is available for investors 
                                                        
30
 My analysis differs from Bernard and Thomas (1989) in that their earnings expectation is based on time series 
models, whereas the earnings expectation in this study is based on analyst earnings forecasts. Therefore the “post 
earnings announcement effect” documented in this study is not exactly the same as those in previous studies.  
31
 I focus my analysis on the window 2 days after earnings announcement and 20 days before earnings 
announcement of the subsequent quarter to capture market reactions to information provided in financial 
statements. See section 6.2 for more explanations. 
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to better assess the possibility of earnings management.  These results also suggest 
that investors under-estimate the possibility that zero or small positive earnings 
surprises are achieved through earnings management, and/or the extent of earnings 
management to avoid negative earnings surprises at the time of earnings 
announcement.  
The analysis described in this chapter is related to Balsam et al. (2002). The 
authors document a significantly negative association between discretionary accruals 
and market returns around 10-Q filings date for a sample of firms meeting or beating 
analyst forecasts by less than 1 penny.32  The analysis described in this chapter is 
different from that in Balsam et al.’s study in the following ways. First, their study 
focuses on the relation between discretionary accruals and stock returns for a sample 
of firms reporting a zero or small positive surprise, whereas my analysis investigates 
the average investor response to zero and small positive earnings surprises after the 
earnings announcement, and thereby answers the question whether investors fully 
respond to the “zero and small positive earnings surprises” as an indicator of earnings 
management at the time of earnings announcement. The average negative CARs 
associated with zero and small positive earnings surprises in the post-earnings 
announcement period are likely caused by investor reaction to evidence of all forms 
of earnings management, not just evidence of accruals management, which may be 
revealed by balance sheet data. In addition to managing earnings through 
discretionary accruals, firms have many other methods of manipulating earnings. For 
instance, firms can take real actions to report higher earnings (see Degeorge et al. 
1999); cut R&D to meet or narrowly beat analyst forecasts (Bushee 1998). 
                                                        
32
 Balsam et al (2002) only examine a subset of MNB earnings, earnings with discretionary accruals higher than 
1% of total assets and in the sample period from 1996-1998. Their sample consists of 613 firm quarters. 
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Roychowdhury (2005) summarizes a list of earnings management methods through 
managing real activities. Investors’ ability to “see through” earnings management via 
managing real activities based on full balance sheet data will result in lower abnormal 
returns for zero and small positive earnings surprises in the post-earnings 
announcement period.33   Therefore, the tests in this chapter differ from those in 
Balsam et al. (2002) in both purpose and scope of investigation.  
Second, the sample period of this chapter covers 21 years from 1984 to 2004. The 
longer sample period allows investigation of temporal change in post-announcement 
investor response to zero and small positive earnings surprises, given the increasing 
probability of earnings just above analyst forecasts being results of earnings 
management, because of increasingly management’s propensity to meet or beat 
analysts’ forecasts. 
 Lastly, I do not limit my analysis to the return windows around 10-Q filing date, 
because sophisticated investors may have earlier access to the balance sheet 
information as suggested by the results in Balsam et al. (2002), and because Easton 
and Zmijewski (1993) fail to find abnormal stock returns around 10-Q filing dates. I 
focus on the window 2 day after earnings announcement date to 20 days before the 
earnings announcement date of the subsequent quarter to allow enough time for 
balance sheet information to be impounded into prices, and to avoid capturing price 
reactions to preempt of earnings news of the subsequent quarter which is usually 
within 20 days before earnings announcement date. 
In the rest of this chapter, I present the tests and analysis in Section 6.2 and 
summarize the findings in Section 6.3. 
                                                        
33
 Since the focus of this chapter is on the average investor response to zero and small positive earnings surprises 
after earnings announcement date, I do not investigate how investors identify firms manage earnings to report zero 
and small positive earnings surprises. 
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6.2. Tests and Results 
6.2.1 Post-announcement CAR 
Figure 6.1 plots the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns over about 60 
trading days after earnings announcement (t+2 to t+60) for the 1984-1991, 1992-1997 
and 1998-2004 sample periods. Firms are partitioned into 3 groups according to their 
reported raw earnings surprises: earnings surprises greater than 1 cent, earnings 
surprises between zero and 1 cent (zero and small positive earnings surprises), and 
negative earnings surprises. My focus is on the drift for zero and small positive 
earnings surprises, the drifts for the two other groups are provided for comparison 
purpose.  As Figure 6.1 shows, the CARs for earnings surprises greater than 1 cent 
and negative earnings surprises drift upward and downward respectively, consistent 
with prior literature on the post earnings announcement drift.34  The 60-day CAR for 
earnings surprises greater than 1 cent is about 3% for the first sample period, and 
2.6% (2%) for the second (third) sample period. The trading strategy of buying stocks 
with earning surprises greater than 1 cent and selling stocks with negative earnings 
surprises yields about 3.3% for the 1984-1991 period , and 2.9% (2.4%) quarterly 
return for the 1992-1997 (1998-2004) period. The result is consistent with the 
evidence that profit from exploiting post-earnings- announcement drift is smaller in 
more recent years (Johonson and Swartsz 2000).35  The post earnings announcement 
drift for firms reporting zero or small positive surprises is upward in the first period 
(2%), but it is only slightly upward for the second period (0.5%),  and is slightly 
                                                        
34
  Note that the post earnings announcement drift documented in this chapter is based on earnings surprises using 
analyst forecasts as earnings expectation. Prior studies use earnings expectation estimated from time series models. 
35
 Johanson and Swartz (2000) show that the magnitude of post-earnings announcement drift is reduced in their 
sample period from 1991-1997, after the publications of several papers documented post earnings announcement 
drift (Bernard and Thomas 1989, 1990).Another reason for the smaller magnitude of post earnings announcement 
drift as compared to prior studies is that I do not examine the return difference between extreme positive earnings 
surprises and extreme negative earnings surprises.  
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downward for the third sample period (-0.2%). While the 60-day CAR for earnings 
surprises greater than 1 cent decreased by only 0.4% (1%) from the first sample 
period to the second (third) sample period, the 60-day CAR for zero and small 
positive surprises decreased by about 1.4% for the 1992-1997 period and about 2.1% 
for the 1998-2004 period. Therefore, the temporal change in investor response to zero 
and small positive surprises can not be totally explained by the reduction in the 
amount of upward drift for positive surprises over the sample periods.  
<------ Insert Figure 6.1 here -----> 
The temporal change is consistent with a downward drift in earnings quality over time. 
Matsumoto (2002), Brown (2001) Bartov et al (2002), Lopes and Rees (2002), Brown 
and Caylor (2005) all document that management’s propensity to meet or beat analyst 
forecasts since earlier 1990’s. If not all of zero and small positive earnings surprises 
are achieved through legitimate means, the increase in tendency to meet or beat 
analyst forecasts suggests increasing management’s intervention in earnings reporting 
process, which in turn, has eroded the quality of earnings just above analyst forecasts.  
6.2.2 Regression Analysis 
The analysis presented in Figure 6.1 does not control for the effect of post earnings 
announcement drift. Bernard & Thomas (1989) provide evidence that post earnings 
announcement CARs vary monotonically with earnings surprises, suggesting that 
investors under-react to earnings information. Therefore, to examine how investors 
respond to zero and small positive raw earnings surprises, it is necessary to control for 
investor under-reaction to earnings news. Another drawback of the analysis in Figure 
6.1 is that it does not consider the risk factors that may affect returns. To control for 
these effects, the following regression is estimated: 
 - 79 - 
εββββββ ++++++=+ ttt MNBBETASIZEMBSURPDQRET 5432101 /  
      ----------------------------------(7) 
Where: 
QRETt+1: market adjusted abnormal return cumulated over one quarter from 1 day 
after earnings announcement of fiscal quarter t till 20 day before earnings 
announcement of fiscal quarter t+1. 
SURPDt: decile ranking of earnings surprises (raw earnings surprise scaled by price) 
divided by 10. Thus SURPDt takes value from 0 to 0.9. Price is the closing 
price one day before latest I/B/E/S consensus calculation date for period t. The 
earnings surprises are defined as actual earnings reported by I/B/E/S minus 
mean analyst forecasts. 
MNB: dummy variable equal to 1 if raw earnings surprises of current fiscal quarter is 
between zero and 1 cent, and zero otherwise. 
B/M: book to market ratio at the end of fiscal quarter t-1.  
SIZE: log market value at the end of fiscal quarter t-1. 
BETA: Beta estimated from the market model over the 255-day period ending 41 days 
before the earnings announcement of current fiscal quarter t. 
As mentioned earlier, the return window between 2 days after earnings 
announcement of current quarter and 20 days before earnings announcement of the 
subsequent quarter is chosen to capture market response to balance sheet information. 
Form 10-Q is usually filed with SEC several weeks after earnings announcement.36 
However, sophisticated investors may have earlier access to the 10-Q fillings through 
conference calls or private conversations with the management. Moreover, I allow 
                                                        
36
 For example, the median number of days between earnings announcement date and 10-Q filings date is 23 days 
in Balsam et al. (2002). 
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enough time for investors to digest financial statement information. The return 
window stops at 20 days before earnings announcement of quarter t+1 to avoid 
investor response to the preempt earnings news for quarter t+1. Prior studies show 
that realized earnings leak into the market before earnings announcement date through 
earnings preannouncements (Soffer et al. 2000). Kinney et al. (2002) use return 
window between 20 days before earnings announcement and one day after earnings 
announcement to examine surprise-return relation. On average there is 68 calendar-
day gap between 2 days after earnings announcement date of quarter t and 20 days 
before earnings announcement date quarter t+1. 
SURPDt  is included in the model to control for the market under-reaction to 
earnings news for the current quarter t. Following prior studies (Liang 2003, Ke and 
Ramalingegowaa 2005 ), I use the decile rank of earnings surprises.37  Prior studies on 
the post-earnings announcement-drift suggest the coefficient on SURPDt is positive. 
If investors respond unfavorably to firms reporting zero or small positive earnings 
surprises in the post earnings announcement, the coefficient on MNB should be 
negative. 
<------ Insert Table 6.1 here -----> 
Descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in Panel A of Table 6.1. Panel 
B of Table 6.1 shows a correlation matrix of all variables of interest, with Pearson 
(Spearman) correlations below (above) the diagonal. Among the other variables, the 
correlations coefficients are small in magnitude. Therefore, multi-collinearlity is not a 
concern in the following regressions. 
Table 6.2 presents the results of Regression (7). In the first period (1984-1991), 
                                                        
37
 I try original value of earnings surprises in the regression. The results remain unchanged. 
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the coefficient on SURPDt is 0.048, and is statistically significant, suggesting that 
buying stocks with the highest decile of positive earnings surprises earns 4.8% 
abnormal returns higher than the extreme decile of negative surprises. More 
importantly, the coefficient on MNB dummy, representing the average returns for 
firms reporting zero or small positive surprises, is not statistically different from zero. 
It seems that investors do not particularly respond to firms reporting zero or small 
positive surprises after controlling for the post-earnings-announcement-drift effect, in 
the sample period when there is no significant evidence of management’s tendency to 
meet or beat analyst forecasts. The regression results in the second period (1992-1997) 
are different from those in the first period. The coefficient on SURPDt is 0.041, 
significantly positive but is smaller than that in the first period, consistent with the 
decrease in profitability of trading strategy exploiting the post earnings announcement 
drift.  The coefficient on MNB dummy is -0.006 and statistically significant. The 
result suggests that the post-announcement abnormal return for MNB is -0.6% after 
controlling for post-earnings-announcement effect. The magnitude of the abnormal 
returns is reasonable, considering the fact that only 1-2 cents per share are needed to 
avoid small misses. Assuming a stock has earnings multiple of 20 and stock price of 
20 dollars, the pricing impact of manipulating 1-2 cents EPS will result in return 
reversal of about 1-2 percent, if investors fully discount the managed earnings. Note 
that only a proportion of zero and small positive surprises are results of earnings 
management. The regression result for the third sample period (1998-2004) shows 
that the coefficient on SURPDt is further reduced to 0.038. The coefficient on MNB 
dummy is also further reduced to -0.009 and statistically significant. Overall, the 
results show a significant temporal shift in post-announcement investor response to 
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zero and small positive earnings surprises. The temporal shift coincides with the 
temporal change in management tendency to meet or narrowly beat analyst forecasts. 
Therefore, the results are consistent with the conjecture that investors increasingly 
respond unfavorably to the firms reporting zero and small positive earnings surprises 
as the increasing management’s tendency to meet or beat analysts’ forecasts erodes 
the quality of earnings that meet or narrowly beat analyst forecasts. Moreover, 
although investors regard zero and small positive earnings surprises as more likely 
results of manipulations, investors underestimates the extent to which earnings 
management contributes to firms reporting zero or small positive earnings surprises. 
Consequently, investors respond unfavorably to the lower earnings quality of these 
earnings in the period after earnings announcement date with the aid of additional 
information regarding the earnings quality provided in the full set of financial 
statements.  
<------ Insert Table 6.2 here -----> 
6.2.3 Robustness Check 
(1) I use an alternative measure of analyst earnings expectation: the most recent single 
analyst forecast. Although consensus analyst forecasts are what the companies are 
trying to meet or beat, Brown (2001), Bartov et al. (2002), and Brown and Caylor 
(2005) use the most recent single analyst forecasts as analyst earnings expectations. 
Table 6.3 reports results using most recent single analyst forecast as analyst earnings 
expectations. The results are similar to those reported in Table 6.2. The coefficient on 
MNB dummy is not significantly different from zero in period 1984-1991, but 
significantly negative in 1992-1997 and 1998-2004 periods (-0.7% and -0.9% 
respectively). Therefore, unfavorable response to zero and small positive earnings 
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surprises is not sensitive to using an alternative measure of analyst earnings 
expectation. 
<------ Insert Table 6.3 here -----> 
(2) I test an alternative return window. Bartov et al. (2002) examine return 
windows  till 50 days after earnings announcement to allow balance sheet information 
to be fully digested by investors. I regress CAR cumulated from 2 days after earnings 
announcement date till 50 days after earnings announcement date on the independent 
variables in Regression (7). The results from the regression (not tabulated) show a 
similar pattern as that in Table 6.2. The coefficient on MNB dummy is not 
significantly different from zero in period 1984-1991, but significantly negative in 
1992-1997 and 1998-2004 periods (-0.5% and -0.6% respectively). The results are 
somewhat weakened, probably due to the shortened return window. 
(3)  Zero and small positive earnings surprises are defined as earnings surprises 
between zero and 1 cent. Nevertheless, since analyst consensus and actual earnings 
are often rounded to the nearest penny, there is much more clustering of observations 
at exact zero or exact one cent. Therefore, the measured price-scaled surprises of raw 
surprises in [0, 1¢] range are largely affected by the scaling factor: price. To test 
whether my result is affected by an alternative scaling factor, I use absolute value of 
actual reported earnings as alternative scaling factor. The scaled earnings surprises are 
defined as (actuals-consensus)/|actuals|. The results (not tabulated) show that the 
coefficient on MNB dummy is not significantly different from zero in period 1984-
1991, but significantly negative in 1992-1997 and 1998-2004 periods (-0.6% and -
0.9% respectively). 
Moreover, to avoid the effect of scaling, I focus on zero earnings surprises only. 
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Within zero earnings surprises sample, I regress post announcement returns on size, 
B/M, Beta. The mean return for zero earnings surprises for the 1992-1997 (1998-2004) 
period is 1.2% (1.3%) lower than that for the 1984-1991 period, and the differences 
are statistically significant (results untabulated). 
(4) I estimate Regression (7) using the sample after deleting observations from the 
fourth fiscal quarter. Managers may have less discretion to increase earnings due to 
increased auditor scrutiny (Francis et al. 1996). Moreover, while 10-Q filings are 
required 45 days after the first three quarterly earnings announcement, for the last 
fiscal quarter, 10-K forms are required to file with SEC 90 days after fiscal quarter 
end. The results (not reported) suggest that my findings are unchanged after deleting 
the fourth fiscal quarter.  
 
6.2.4 Controlling for Discretionary Accruals 
In this section, I examine to what extent my results can be explained by negative 
accrual-return relation around 10-Q filing dates as documented in Balsam et al. (2002).  
If firms manipulate earnings to meet or beat analyst forecast only through managing 
discretionary accruals, it is possible that the average post-announcement investor 
response to zero and small positive earnings surprises can be largely explained by the 
findings in Balsam et al. (2002).  
To test this possibility, I examine average investor response to zero and small 
positive earnings surprises after controlling for the effect of discretionary accruals. I 
estimate the following regression: 
BETASIZEMBSURPDQRET tt 432101 / βββββ ++++=+  
    εβββ +×+++ DAMNBDAMNB 765  --------(8) 
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Where  
DA: Discretionary accruals estimated form cross-sectional Modified Jones Model 
controlling for current ROA.38 
I include the interaction term DAMNB × to allow for the possibility that investors 
react differently to discretionary accruals from firms-quarters with zero or small 
positive earnings surprises. If the negative relation between abnormal returns and DA 
explains entirely the negative average response to zero and small positive earnings 
surprises, the coefficient 5β  should be indistinguishable from zero after controlling 
for the effect of discretionary accruals on abnormal returns. The estimation of 
parameters of Regression (8) are reported Table 6.4. The coefficients on DA
 
are 
significantly negative in all three sample periods, consistent with prior evidence of 
negative return-accrual relations. The coefficients on interaction term DAMNB × are 
not significant in all three samples, suggesting that investors do not react differently to 
discretionary accruals for firms with a zero or small positive earnings surprise. More 
importantly, the coefficients on MNB dummy remain significantly negative in 1992-
1997 and 1998-2004 sample periods. Thus, the average negative response to zero and 
small positive earnings surprises is not simply due to the negative association between 
discretionary accruals and abnormal returns documented in Balsam et al. (2002). 
   
                                                        
38
 Detailed of the estimation of the model is as reported in Section 5.2. 
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TABLE  6.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Coefficients 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean 1st Q Median 3rd Q Std. Dev. 
SURPt -0.31 -0.16 0.00 0.16 7.12 
QRETt+1 0.22 9.56 0.32 10.05 18.84 
Beta 0.86 0.44 0.80 1.21 0.59 
SIZE 6.08 4.85 5.98 7.17 1.65 
B/M 0.54 0.29 0.48 0.72 0.37 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients Matrix 
 SURPt Qret t+1 Beta SIZE B/M 
SURPt 
 0.01 0.01 0.05 -0.05 
QRETt+1 0.07  0.00 -0.02 0.03 
Beta 0.04 0.01  0.22 -0.18 
SIZE 0.08 -0.01 0.25  -0.27 
B/M 
-0.03 0.02 -0.22 -0.25  
 
     
 
Note: 
SURPt: Earnings surprises (raw earnings surprise scaled by price), in percentage form. Price 
is the ending price one day before consensus analyst forecasts are issued by I/B/E/S. 
QRETt+1: Market adjusted abnormal return cumulated over about one quarter from 1 day after 
earnings announcement of fiscal quarter t till 20 days before earnings announcement 
of fiscal quarter t+1, in percentage form. 
Beta:  Beta estimated from the market model over the 255-day period ending 41 days before 
the earnings announcement of current fiscal quarter t. 
B/M :  Book to market ratio at the end of period t-1.  




Regression Analysis of Post-announcement Returns 
 
 




Sample Period N 0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  Adj.R-sq(%) 
 
 
       
1984-1991 25,214 -0.011 0.048 0.003 -0.003 0.010 -0.001 1.01 
  (-2.74) (14.37) (1.39) (-5.42) (5.58) (-0.56)  
         
1992-1997 45,070 0.003 0.041 0.010 -0.005 0.003 -0.006 0.34 
  (0.85) (14.31) (4.93) (-9.46) (2.48) (-3.39)  
         
1998-2004 57,810 0.000 0.038 0.002 -0.004 -0.001 -0.009 0.71 
  (0.13) (11.96) (3.49) (-2.31) (-1.69) (-4.80)  
         
 

















Regression Analysis of Post-announcement Returns (The Most Recent Single Analyst Forecast) 
 
 




Sample Period N 0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  Adj.R-sq (%) 
 
 
       
1984-1991 25,214 -0.009 0.043 0.002 -0.003 0.010 -0.003 1.06 
  (-2.30) (13.04) (0.98) (-5.12) (5.65) (-1.37)  
         
1992-1997 45,070 0.005 0.034 0.009 -0.005 0.004 -0.007 0.38 
  (1.41) (11.79) (4.70) (-9.09) (2.85) (-3.96)  
         
1998-2004 57,810 0.000 0.036 0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.009 0.72 
  (0.04) (11.34) (3.44) (-2.21) (-1.47) (-4.70)  
         
 
Note: SURPDt is as the decile ranking of raw earnings surprise (actuals earnings as reported by I/B/E/S minus the most recent single analyst forecasts) scaled 
















TABLE  6.4 
 
Regression Analysis of Post-announcement Returns Controlling for Investor Response to Discretionary Accruals 
 
 




Sample Period N 0β  1β  2β  3β  4β  5β  6β  7β  Adj.R-sq (%) 
 
 
         
1984-1991 8,974 0.003 0.037 -0.001 -0.006 0.024 0.004 -0.104 0.021 1.64 
  (0.46) (6.13) (-0.30) (-6.19) (7.84) (0.92) (-4.62) (0.37)  
           
1992-1997 33,005 -0.006 0.038 0.015 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 -0.068 0.010 0.76 
  (-1.45) (11.56) (5.98) (-5.14) (-1.06) (-3.08) (-5.00) (0.34)  
           
1998-2004 39,679 -0.021 0.035 0.001 -0.012 0.003 -0.012 -0.086 -0.007 0.53 
  (-4.69) (9.22) (1.90) (-6.35) (4.73) (-5.14) (-5.58) (-0.24)  
           
 
Note: SURPDt is as the decile ranking of raw earnings surprise (actuals earnings as reported by I/B/E/S minus the most recent single analyst forecasts) scaled 
by price, divided by 10. DA is discretionary accruals estimated from cross-sectional modified Jones model controlling for current ROA. MNB equals one if 
reported raw earnings surprises are greater than 0 cent and less than 1 cent. Other variables are as defined in Table 6.1. 
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FIGURE 6.1 
 Cumulative Abnormal Returns in the Event Window [+2, +60] after Earnings 
Announcement 
 















































CAR is the market adjusted cumulative abnormal returns. Firm-quarters are assigned into 3 portfolios.  
ES<0: firms-quarters reporting negative earnings surprises. 0<=ES<=0.01: firms-quarters reporting 
zero and small positive earnings surprises less than or equal to 1 cent. ES>0.01: Firm-quarters reporting 









Prior studies suggest that zero or small positive earnings surprises are more likely to 
be the results of earnings and/or forecast management (Degeorge et al.1999; 
Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Burgstahlar and Eames 2006). However, it is difficult 
for investors to identify possible manipulators at the time of earnings announcement 
when other financial statements are generally not yet available. With insufficient 
information to identify manipulators, investors may be skeptical of zero or small 
positive earnings surprises, and respond less favorably to these earnings surprises as 
compared to larger earnings surprises. Consistent with this prediction, I find that the 
ERC for zero or small positive earnings surprises is lower than that for earnings 
surprises in adjacent ranges for firm-quarters in 1992-2004, suggesting that investors 
use a zero or small positive earnings surprise as a clue to identify firms that are 
engaged in earnings and/or expectations management. Moreover, the result is stronger 
in the sample period 1998-2004 than the 1992-1997 period, suggesting that greater 
media attention to “the number game” in recent years has reinforced investors’ 
perception that firms reporting zero or small positive earnings surprises are more 
likely to be manipulators. 
Moreover, I find that another important market participant - analysts also regard a 
zero or small positive earnings surprise as an indicator of manipulations, which lend 
further evidence to my argument. The relation between analyst revisions of next-
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quarter-earnings and current-quarter earnings surprise is negative for zero or small 
positive earnings surprises, while it is positive for earnings surprises in all other 
ranges. This result is particularly stronger in later years of the sample period than in 
the earlier years.  
I also document negative CARs for firms reporting zero or small earnings 
surprises during the subsequent quarter after earnings announcement when balance 
sheet information is available for investors to better assess the possibility of earnings 
management. This result suggests that investors react negatively to increasingly 
eroded quality of earnings just above analyst forecasts with the aid of balance sheet 
information. The continued unfavorable response justifies investors’ use of “zero or 
small positive surprises” as a clue to identify manipulators at the time of earnings 
announcement, but indicates that investors under-estimate the probability that zero or 
small positive earnings surprises are achieved through earnings management. 
The findings presented in this study are informative to both researchers and 
regulators. The unfavorable investor response to zero or small positive surprises at the 
time of earnings announcement and in the subsequent quarter suggests that investors 
perceive these surprises as more likely the results of opportunistic earnings 
management and therefore justify enforcing stricter accounting regulation to curb 
earnings management to meet or beat analyst forecasts.39 
The evidence is also consistent with investor rationality. It is unlikely that rational 
investors keep rewarding meeting or beating analyst forecasts which are increasingly 
achieved through earnings/expectations management. The findings show that 
                                                        
39
 Defond and Park (1997) argue that managers may manipulate earnings upward in anticipation of good future 
earnings. Xue (2004) shows the signaling effect on meeting or beating zero earnings benchmark and previous 
earnings benchmark. Managers signal to the market the firm performance using earnings thresholds. On the other 
hand, Degeorge et al. (1999) and Matsunaga and Park (2001) show that meeting or beating analyst forecasts are the 
results of managers’ self-interest behaviors. The findings provide additional evidence supportive of earnings-
management explanation of the higher concentration of zero or small positive earnings surprises. 
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investors learn form academic publications and industry press, and thus increasingly 
respond unfavorably to a zero or small positive earnings surprise. This is consistent 
with investors behaving rationally, and thus contributes to a more complete 
understanding of how investors form their inferences regarding the well known 
“number game”.  
This study opens potentially interesting avenues for future research. First, this 
study shows that investors discount zero or small positive earnings surprises because 
of their skepticism towards such surprises. Along a similar line, firm characteristics 
associated with higher propensity to meet or beat analyst forecasts may also arouse 
such investor skepticism. Matsumoto (2002) finds that firms with higher transient 
institutional ownership, greater reliance on implicit claims with their stakeholders, 
and higher value-relevance of earnings are more likely to meet or exceed expectations. 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) show that growth firms have stronger incentives to meet 
analyst forecasts. Future research can investigate possible different investor pricing 
due to stronger skepticism towards these firms. Second, I argue that market 
participants respond to a zero or small positive earnings surprise unfavorably in 
anticipation of worsened future firm performance due to current earnings management. 
An investigation of the relation between long term firm performance and current zero 
or small positive surprises can provide direct support for my argument. This research 
requires a longer period of earnings performance window and is thus left for future 
research. The current study and these potential future investigations would deepen our 
insight into the behaviors of different parties in the so called “number game”. 
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